Does same-origin redirect enforcement break MCP servers behind a reverse proxy?

Reading the v2.2.0 release notes: the HTTP client now fails redirects with MCPError unless the target is same-origin. For self-hosted setups this seems like it could bite people running an MCP server behind something like Caddy or nginx — e.g. an HTTP→HTTPS redirect, or a redirect from a bare port to a subpath, which often lands on a different-looking origin even though it's the same server.

The changelog doesn't say whether there's a way to allowlist additional origins for these cases, or whether the guidance is simply "don't let your reverse proxy redirect, terminate TLS and proxy_pass directly." Is there a documented escape hatch, or is this an intentional hard stop meant to force removing redirects from self-hosted deployments entirely? A line in the migration notes about the reverse-proxy case would save people a confusing debugging session when their server that worked in 2.1.x suddenly throws on upgrade.

从 v2.2.0 发布说明以及 issue 中描述的 HTTP 客户端重定向强制机制开始。确认是否可以将其他 origin 加入 allowlist，以及 HTTP 到 HTTPS 的重定向或子路径重定向在 reverse proxy 后面如何工作。使用已确认的 escape hatch 或面向自托管 MCP 服务器的部署指导更新迁移说明。