Does same-origin redirect enforcement break MCP servers behind a reverse proxy?

Reading the v2.2.0 release notes: the HTTP client now fails redirects with MCPError unless the target is same-origin. For self-hosted setups this seems like it could bite people running an MCP server behind something like Caddy or nginx — e.g. an HTTP→HTTPS redirect, or a redirect from a bare port to a subpath, which often lands on a different-looking origin even though it's the same server.

The changelog doesn't say whether there's a way to allowlist additional origins for these cases, or whether the guidance is simply "don't let your reverse proxy redirect, terminate TLS and proxy_pass directly." Is there a documented escape hatch, or is this an intentional hard stop meant to force removing redirects from self-hosted deployments entirely? A line in the migration notes about the reverse-proxy case would save people a confusing debugging session when their server that worked in 2.1.x suddenly throws on upgrade.

Beginne mit den v2.2.0-Release Notes und der im Issue beschriebenen Durchsetzung von Weiterleitungen durch den HTTP-Client. Überprüfe, ob zusätzliche Origins auf die Allowlist gesetzt werden können und wie HTTP-zu-HTTPS- oder Subpfad-Weiterleitungen hinter einem Reverse Proxy funktionieren. Aktualisiere die Migrationshinweise mit dem bestätigten Escape Hatch oder den Deployment-Hinweisen für selbst gehostete MCP-Server.