Does same-origin redirect enforcement break MCP servers behind a reverse proxy?

Reading the v2.2.0 release notes: the HTTP client now fails redirects with MCPError unless the target is same-origin. For self-hosted setups this seems like it could bite people running an MCP server behind something like Caddy or nginx — e.g. an HTTP→HTTPS redirect, or a redirect from a bare port to a subpath, which often lands on a different-looking origin even though it's the same server.

The changelog doesn't say whether there's a way to allowlist additional origins for these cases, or whether the guidance is simply "don't let your reverse proxy redirect, terminate TLS and proxy_pass directly." Is there a documented escape hatch, or is this an intentional hard stop meant to force removing redirects from self-hosted deployments entirely? A line in the migration notes about the reverse-proxy case would save people a confusing debugging session when their server that worked in 2.1.x suddenly throws on upgrade.

Commencez par les notes de version v2.2.0 et l’application des redirections du client HTTP décrite dans l’issue. Vérifiez si des origines supplémentaires peuvent être ajoutées à l’allowlist et comment se comportent les redirections de HTTP vers HTTPS ou de sous-chemin derrière un reverse proxy. Mettez à jour les notes de migration avec l’escape hatch confirmé ou les indications de déploiement pour les serveurs MCP auto-hébergés.