Security issue: possible command injection in GitHub Actions workflow

Hello maintainers,

I would like to report a potential command-injection vulnerability in your GitHub Actions workflow.

The affected workflow file(s) invoke an LLM to process and summarize issues, and then directly concatenate the LLM output into a shell command argument for gh issue comment --body. Because untrusted model output is inserted into a shell command context, an attacker may craft a malicious issue so that the LLM response contains an injection payload.

Impact:

• Possible command injection during workflow execution.
• Possible leakage of sensitive environment variables (for example GITHUB_TOKEN or GH_TOKEN).
• Although these tokens are typically short-lived and scoped to workflow job/step execution, an attacker may attempt to prolong execution time (for example via sleep-based techniques) and abuse the token during that window.

Recommended remediation:

• Do not place ${{ steps.inference.outputs.response }} directly in a shell command argument.
• Pass it through a step environment variable first (for example RESPONSE).
• In shell, reference it only as a double-quoted variable (for example "$RESPONSE").

Affected workflow file(s) observed:

• https://github.com/jd-opensource/jd-github-template/blob/6656b21cf8dfb9de5b2f7707a3ad294820c59902/.github/workflows/summary.yml

Thank you for your time and for maintaining this project.

まず、参照されているコミットの .github/workflows/summary.yml を読み、推論レスポンスが gh issue comment --body にどのように渡されているかに注目してください。信頼できない出力が環境変数を介して転送され、引用符付きのシェル変数として参照されていることを確認してください。ワークフローが推論出力をシェルコマンドコンテキストに直接配置しなくなれば完了です。