[ACP] toolCall.title contains high-level summary instead of executable command, hiding shell command in client approval modals

### Describe the bug

When running the GitHub Copilot CLI in Agent Context Protocol (ACP) mode (e.g., connected to host editors like Zed), `toolCall.title` is populated with a high-level natural language summary (e.g., `"Search whole monorepo for double-entry"`) while the actual shell execution string is nested deep inside `toolCall.rawInput.command`.

Because ACP host clients rely on standard fields like `title` or top-level arguments to render command preview cards in their permission dialogs, users are asked to approve tool execution without being able to see the underlying shell command, flags, or parameters.

During a tool approval request, Copilot CLI ACP emits a JSON-RPC payload structured as follows:

```
{
"sessionId": "d32e979a-eaa8-4e53-a31a-f9a1dba6bc09",
"toolCall": {
"toolCallId": "call-9480410f-3f47-441c-bcc3-decf647077aa-15",
"title": "Search whole monorepo for double-entry",
"kind": "execute",
"status": "pending",
"rawInput": {
"command": "grep -rn -i 'double.entry\\|double_entry\\|DoubleEntry' ./ --include='*.ts' 2>/dev/null | head -50; ls ./",
"commands": [
"grep -rn -i 'double.entry\\|double_entry\\|DoubleEntry' ./ --include='*.ts' 2>/dev/null | head -50; ls ./"
]
}
},
"options": [
{
"optionId": "allow_once",
"kind": "allow_once",
"name": "Allow once"
},
{
"optionId": "allow_always",
"kind": "allow_always",
"name": "Always allow"
},
{
"optionId": "reject_once",
"kind": "reject_once",
"name": "Deny"
}
]
}
```

`toolCall.title` contains the high-level intent: `"Search whole monorepo for double-entry"`.

The actual raw command string is only present inside `rawInput.command` / `rawInput.commands`.

In ACP host clients (such as Zed), the UI permission modal displays `toolCall.title` as the title/code snippet preview, causing the actual executable string to remain completely hidden from the user during authorization

### Affected version

GitHub Copilot CLI 1.0.77

### Steps to reproduce the behavior

### **Steps to Reproduce**

1. Configure GitHub Copilot CLI as an ACP server in Zed (via the ACP Registry or in `settings.json`):
```json
{
"agent_servers": {
"Copilot": {
"type": "custom",
"command": "copilot",
"args": ["--acp"]
}
}
}

```

2. Open any workspace or codebase in Zed.
3. Open the Agent Panel (`Cmd+?` on macOS / `Ctrl+?` on Linux/Windows) and start a new thread using the **Copilot** ACP agent.
4. Enter a prompt that triggers a shell tool call requiring client approval (e.g., *"Search the whole monorepo for double-entry pattern"*).
5. When Zed displays the tool execution approval dialog, observe the command preview card.

### **Observed Result**

The approval card displays the natural-language intent string (`"Search whole monorepo for double-entry"`) in place of the executable command. The actual shell command (`grep -rn -i ...`) remains hidden inside `toolCall.rawInput.command`.

### **Expected Result**

The approval dialog should render the actual raw shell command string (or include it within `toolCall.title` / standard tool arguments), allowing the user to inspect the exact flags, paths, and commands before granting execution authorization.

### Expected behavior

`toolCall.title` should explicitly contain or start with the raw command string being executed (e.g., `grep -rn -i ...`),

### Additional context

_No response_

Inizia riproducendo il flusso ACP con il server `--acp` in Zed e verifica come vengono valorizzati `toolCall.title`, `rawInput.command` e `rawInput.commands` per le richieste di approvazione. Traccia la generazione del payload di approvazione ACP e verifica che l’anteprima risultante del client esponga il comando shell esatto, inclusi flag e parametri, prima dell’autorizzazione.

Scritto dal modello di indicizzazione a partire dal testo della issue.