[ACP] toolCall.title contains high-level summary instead of executable command, hiding shell command in client approval modals

Describe the bug

When running the GitHub Copilot CLI in Agent Context Protocol (ACP) mode (e.g., connected to host editors like Zed), toolCall.title is populated with a high-level natural language summary (e.g., "Search whole monorepo for double-entry") while the actual shell execution string is nested deep inside toolCall.rawInput.command.

Because ACP host clients rely on standard fields like title or top-level arguments to render command preview cards in their permission dialogs, users are asked to approve tool execution without being able to see the underlying shell command, flags, or parameters.

During a tool approval request, Copilot CLI ACP emits a JSON-RPC payload structured as follows:

{
  "sessionId": "d32e979a-eaa8-4e53-a31a-f9a1dba6bc09",
  "toolCall": {
    "toolCallId": "call-9480410f-3f47-441c-bcc3-decf647077aa-15",
    "title": "Search whole monorepo for double-entry",
    "kind": "execute",
    "status": "pending",
    "rawInput": {
      "command": "grep -rn -i 'double.entry\\|double_entry\\|DoubleEntry' ./ --include='*.ts' 2>/dev/null | head -50; ls ./",
      "commands": [
        "grep -rn -i 'double.entry\\|double_entry\\|DoubleEntry' ./ --include='*.ts' 2>/dev/null | head -50; ls ./"
      ]
    }
  },
  "options": [
    {
      "optionId": "allow_once",
      "kind": "allow_once",
      "name": "Allow once"
    },
    {
      "optionId": "allow_always",
      "kind": "allow_always",
      "name": "Always allow"
    },
    {
      "optionId": "reject_once",
      "kind": "reject_once",
      "name": "Deny"
    }
  ]
}

toolCall.title contains the high-level intent: "Search whole monorepo for double-entry".

The actual raw command string is only present inside rawInput.command / rawInput.commands.

In ACP host clients (such as Zed), the UI permission modal displays toolCall.title as the title/code snippet preview, causing the actual executable string to remain completely hidden from the user during authorization

Affected version

GitHub Copilot CLI 1.0.77

Steps to reproduce the behavior

Steps to Reproduce

1. Configure GitHub Copilot CLI as an ACP server in Zed (via the ACP Registry or in settings.json):

{
  "agent_servers": {
    "Copilot": {
      "type": "custom",
      "command": "copilot",
      "args": ["--acp"]
    }
  }
}

2. Open any workspace or codebase in Zed.
3. Open the Agent Panel (Cmd+? on macOS / Ctrl+? on Linux/Windows) and start a new thread using the Copilot ACP agent.
4. Enter a prompt that triggers a shell tool call requiring client approval (e.g., "Search the whole monorepo for double-entry pattern").
5. When Zed displays the tool execution approval dialog, observe the command preview card.

Observed Result

The approval card displays the natural-language intent string ("Search whole monorepo for double-entry") in place of the executable command. The actual shell command (grep -rn -i ...) remains hidden inside toolCall.rawInput.command.

Expected Result

The approval dialog should render the actual raw shell command string (or include it within toolCall.title / standard tool arguments), allowing the user to inspect the exact flags, paths, and commands before granting execution authorization.

Expected behavior

toolCall.title should explicitly contain or start with the raw command string being executed (e.g., grep -rn -i ...),

Additional context

No response

Beginne damit, den ACP-Ablauf mit dem --acp-Server in Zed zu reproduzieren und zu untersuchen, wie toolCall.title, rawInput.command und rawInput.commands für Genehmigungsanfragen befüllt werden. Verfolge die Generierung der ACP-Genehmigungs-Payload und überprüfe, dass die resultierende Client-Vorschau vor der Autorisierung den exakten Shell-Befehl einschließlich Flags und Parametern offenlegt.