False negative in go/email-injection for password reset links built from Forwarded / X-Forwarded-Host
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Descripción
Hi team,
I think I found a false negative in `go/email-injection`.
I ran into this while looking at ZITADEL's `CVE-2025-64101` / `GHSA-mwmh-7px9-4c23`. The vulnerable flow is:
- host data comes from `Forwarded` / `X-Forwarded-Host`
- it is stored in a request/domain context object
- that value is later carried through an event / notification path
- and eventually used to build a password reset link that gets emailed to the user
Very roughly, it looks like this:
```go
hostFromHeader = r.Header.Get(header)
if host == "" {
host = hostFromHeader
}
TriggeredAtOrigin: http.DomainContext(ctx).Origin()
url = login.InitPasswordLink(http_utils.DomainContext(ctx).Origin(), user.ID, code, user.ResourceOwner, authRequestID)
```
The upstream fix sanitizes the host before storing it in the domain context, so this seems like a real missed case, not just a noisy benchmark result.
My guess is that the source side is already covered well enough, since `net/http.Request.Header` is modeled as remote input. The gap seems to be later in the flow, once the value moves through custom structs / event fields / notification helpers before it becomes part of email content.
I think this pattern is fairly common in real Go code. Password reset and verification links are often built indirectly through app-specific context and mailer abstractions, not directly inside a modeled mail API call.
For comparison, Semgrep did flag this codebase, but only with a broader rule about request-derived origin/host usage. It was not precise, but the general idea may still be useful here: request-header-derived host/origin values that later become user-facing links in emails probably deserve better coverage.
A reasonable fix might be improving `go/email-injection` so flow is preserved better through custom carrier objects and “build link first, send email later” patterns.
Guía de contribución
Línea de trabajo
Comienza en go/email-injection y rastrea cómo su flujo de source a sink gestiona los valores que pasan a través de structs personalizados, campos de eventos y helpers de notificación. Compáralo con la ruta descrita de Forwarded/X-Forwarded-Host a password-reset-link; se considera terminado cuando la consulta cubre el flujo indirecto y evita el falso negativo informado.
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Evaluación
- Stack tecnológico
- go
- Área
- security
- Tipo de issue
- Error
- Dificultad
- 4/5
- Tiempo estimado
- 3-5 días
- Estado de actividad
- Tranquilo
- Claridad
- Bastante claro
- Aptitud para principiantes
- 45/100