DCR registration accepts redirect_uris with non-HTTPS / non-loopback / fragmented schemes

Summary

The DCR handler (mcp.server.auth.handlers.register.RegistrationHandler.handle) does not validate the scheme of submitted redirect_uris. A client registered via DCR can supply javascript:, data:, vbscript:, file:, ftp:, or cleartext http:// (non-loopback) values, and they pass through to the provider's register_client. The SDK already enforces an HTTPS-or-loopback policy on the Issuer URL (routes.validate_issuer_url); the same policy is missing for registered redirect_uris. RFC 9700 §4.1.1 and RFC 7591 §2 require it.

Reproduction

The underlying field, mcp.shared.auth.OAuthClientMetadata.redirect_uris (src/mcp/shared/auth.py:40), is typed list[AnyUrl] | None. Pydantic's AnyUrl accepts any well-formed URL with a scheme. Verified on main at 161834d4ae:

from pydantic import AnyUrl, BaseModel, Field
from typing import List

class M(BaseModel):
    redirect_uris: List[AnyUrl] = Field(..., min_length=1)

for uri in [
    "javascript:alert(1)",
    "data:text/html,<script>alert(1)</script>",
    "file:///etc/passwd",
    "vbscript:msgbox(1)",
    "ftp://attacker.example/cb",
    "http://attacker.example/cb",
    "https://example.com/cb#frag",
    "https://example.com/cb#",
]:
    M(redirect_uris=[uri])  # all accepted, no ValidationError

Against a running MCP server with the default DCR handler, POST /register with any of the above values returns 201 and stores the URI. After registration, OAuthClientMetadata.validate_redirect_uri does exact-equality match against the registered list, so the bad URI is accepted as the authorization callback target.

Existing parallel logic to mirror

src/mcp/server/auth/routes.py:24–42 (validate_issuer_url):

if url.scheme != "https" and url.host not in ("localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]"):
    raise ValueError("Issuer URL must be HTTPS")

if url.fragment:
    raise ValueError("Issuer URL must not have a fragment")

Related

• #1446 (closed as duplicate, no cross-reference recorded) — raised the same concern in question form.
• #1934 (open) — fixes RFC 8252 §7.3 loopback port matching at authorize-time. Adjacent surface but orthogonal; does not add scheme validation at register-time.
• TypeScript SDK PR modelcontextprotocol/typescript-sdk#1738 covers the same authorize-time loopback gap on the TS side.

Proposed fix

Add validate_registered_redirect_uri(url: AnyUrl) -> None next to validate_issuer_url:

• Reject schemes other than https, or http with host in {"localhost", "127.0.0.1", "[::1]"}.
• Reject URIs with a fragment (including empty fragments, e.g. https://example.com/cb# — note: this is also a latent bug in validate_issuer_url's current if url.fragment: check, which I have NOT touched here to keep scope tight).
• Permit query strings (RFC 7591 §2 explicitly allows them).

Call it once per URI in RegistrationHandler.handle immediately after model_validate_json succeeds. On failure return 400 invalid_redirect_uri per RFC 7591 §3.2.2.

PR with the patch + tests: #<PR_NUM_HERE>.

Notes on severity

Browsers no longer navigate javascript: / data: schemes received in Location headers, which neutralises those vectors for browser-mediated flows. The realistic exploitable residue is (a) cleartext-HTTP redirect_uris to attacker-controlled hosts, and (b) custom-scheme deep links on devices where the MCP client uses a system handler. Defense-in-depth, not a critical exploit chain — happy to be downgraded if maintainers see it differently.

Leggi src/mcp/server/auth/routes.py per validate_issuer_url, quindi esamina RegistrationHandler.handle e OAuthClientMetadata in src/mcp/shared/auth.py. Riproduci i casi di URI di reindirizzamento forniti con POST /register, aggiungi una copertura mirata per HTTPS accettato o HTTP loopback e per schemi o frammenti rifiutati, e conferma che gli input non validi restituiscano 400 invalid_redirect_uri.