[Security] MacVim affected by GHSA-2fpv-9ff7-xg5w — tar.vim command injection via crafted .tgz filename (vim < 9.2.0479)

Summary

MacVim bundles runtime/autoload/tar.vim containing tar#Vimuntar(), which builds :!gunzip and :!gzip -d shell commands using shellescape(tartail) without the {special} flag. On Unix-like systems, Vim re-expands cmdline-special characters (%, #, !, etc.) before passing a :! command to the shell, so a crafted .tgz filename can inject arbitrary shell commands. The fix from vim 9.2.0479 (3fb5e58fbc63d86a3e65f1a141b0d67af2aa38a1) has not been applied to macvim r183.

Vulnerability Details

• GHSA: GHSA-2fpv-9ff7-xg5w
• CVE: CVE-2026-46483
• Upstream fix (vim): 9.2.0479 (commit 3fb5e58fbc63d86a3e65f1a141b0d67af2aa38a1, 2026-05-14)
• Affected code: runtime/autoload/tar.vim — tar#Vimuntar() function
• Vulnerability type: CWE-78 — OS Command Injection

Root Cause

In tar#Vimuntar(), the archive tail filename (tartail = expand("%:t")) is passed to :! commands via shellescape() without the required second argument ({special}=1):

" runtime/autoload/tar.vim lines 809-812 (macvim r183)
if executable("gunzip")
  silent exe "!gunzip ".shellescape(tartail)
elseif executable("gzip")
  silent exe "!gzip -d ".shellescape(tartail)

As documented in :help shellescape(), when using the result in a :! command, the second argument must be non-zero so that Vim cmdline-special characters are also escaped. Without it, a filename like ';%$(touch pwned)'.tgz causes Vim to expand % and ! before the shell sees the argument.

Suggested Fix

Merge vim patches up to at least 9.2.0479. The fix adds , 1 to both shellescape() calls:

" Fixed (vim 9.2.0479):
if executable("gunzip")
  silent exe "!gunzip ".shellescape(tartail, 1)
elseif executable("gzip")
  silent exe "!gzip -d ".shellescape(tartail, 1)

References

• GHSA: https://github.com/vim/vim/security/advisories/GHSA-2fpv-9ff7-xg5w
• Upstream fix: https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/3fb5e58fbc63d86a3e65f1a141b0d67af2aa38a1

Beginnen Sie in runtime/autoload/tar.vim bei tar#Vimuntar() und vergleichen Sie die beiden shellescape()-Aufrufe mit dem Upstream-Vim-Commit 3fb5e58fbc63d86a3e65f1a141b0d67af2aa38a1. Wenden Sie den Upstream-Sicherheitsfix an und überprüfen Sie, dass ein präparierter .tgz-Dateiname keine Befehlsinjektion mehr über den gunzip- oder gzip-Pfad ermöglicht.