JSON-RPC: sendChatText / broadcastChatMessage / setServerName accept unbounded strings

Describe the bug

jamulusclient/sendChatText, jamulusserver/broadcastChatMessage and jamulusserver/setServerName validate only that their string parameter is a string — no length bound — unlike the sibling chat methods, which reject input above MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT (1600):

• jamulusserver/privateChatMessage — rejects > MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT (src/serverrpc.cpp:125).
• jamulusserver/setWelcomeMessage — rejects > MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT (src/serverrpc.cpp:325).

Normal clients cannot produce such input: the GUI chat dialog truncates input at MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT (src/chatdlg.cpp:111). So these three methods deviate from both the peer RPC methods and the GUI path.

Reachable impact on current main

Since #3861 the JSON-RPC transport caps each request line at 16 KiB (MAX_JSON_RPC_REQUEST_BYTES, src/rpcserver.cpp:116), so the message is transport-bounded. It still exceeds the receive-side limits: EvaluateChatTextMes reads at most MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT_PLUS_HTML (1800) chars (src/protocol.cpp:1424) and split reassembly caps at 36 parts, while the sender fragments via CreateAndSendMessage with ceil(len / 550) parts and no part-count cap (src/protocol.cpp:590). Result: a ~16 KiB broadcastChatMessage produces a ~27-datagram split burst per connected client that is then silently discarded by every peer. Not memory-unsafe; low severity, but the handlers do not enforce the parameter contract their siblings and the GUI do. An oversized setServerName similarly carries into server-list registration messages to directories and clients.

To Reproduce

1. Run a server: jamulus -s --nogui --jsonrpcport 22150 --jsonrpcsecretfile <secret> (secret >= 16 chars), connect one client.
2. Call jamulusserver/broadcastChatMessage with chatMessage of 10,000 chars. Handler returns ok; peers receive the fragmented message and drop it (receiver bound 1800).
3. Call it with 20,000 chars: transport rejects with Parse error: Request exceeds maximum size of 16384 bytes.

Measured against 3.12.5dev (292506eb): 15,000-char broadcast accepted with a +416 KB server RSS delta and ~27 split parts per client; 20,000-char rejected by the 16 KiB boundary.

Expected behavior

sendChatText, broadcastChatMessage (and setServerName) reject input above MAX_LEN_CHAT_TEXT with iErrInvalidParams, mirroring privateChatMessage / setWelcomeMessage.

Version of Jamulus

3.12.5dev (292506eb), JSON-RPC enabled.

Additional context

Formalizes the "String parameters are bounded inconsistently" item of #3916. #3861 bounds the transport; this issue is the remaining handler-level gap.

🤖 Used AI: big-pickle, opencode