Core: Authorization and Cookie headers leaked to cross-origin servers on HTTP redirect

Environment details

1. Core - HttpRequest in google-http-client
2. OS type and version: Any
3. Java version: Any (Java 8+)
4. google-http-client version: reproducible on current main

Problem Statement
When HttpRequest follows a redirect to a different origin (different scheme, host, or port),
the Cookie header is not stripped. Additionally, Authorization headers set via interceptors
(e.g. BasicAuthentication) are re-applied by the interceptor on subsequent redirect
iterations regardless of destination origin. This can cause credentials to be silently
forwarded to attacker-controlled servers.

Steps to reproduce

1. Build an HttpRequest with an Authorization interceptor (e.g. BasicAuthentication) and a
   Cookie header.
2. Configure the transport to return a 302 redirect to a cross-origin URL (different host).
3. Execute the request.
4. Observe that the second request (to the cross-origin target) still includes Authorization
   and Cookie headers.

Proposed Fix
In handleRedirect(), compute whether the new URL is same-origin as the old URL (comparing
scheme, host, and effective port). Strip Cookie header if cross-origin. In execute(), before
each retry, compare current URL origin to original origin and strip Authorization and Cookie
if the URL has changed to a different origin (e.g. after a previous redirect).

Add getEffectivePort() and isSameOrigin() helpers to normalize default ports (80 for http,
443 for https).

Three regression tests are included in the accompanying PR covering same-origin,
cross-origin host change, scheme change, and port change scenarios.

從 HttpRequest.handleRedirect() 和 execute() 開始，接著檢查 issue 中描述的三個回歸情境。驗證 scheme、host 和 port 發生變更時的 same-origin 行為，包括預設 port 正規化；當 cross-origin 重新導向中不存在 Authorization 和 Cookie 標頭，而 same-origin 重新導向保留預期行為時，即表示完成。