Allow locally-defined stdio MCP servers to run when the MCP registry policy fetch fails (no managed policy in force)

Summary

When the MCP registry policy fetch fails, Copilot CLI fails closed and blocks all non-default MCP servers — including local stdio servers that the user defined themselves in their own ~/.copilot/mcp-config.json and launches as local child processes.

There is currently no way for a user to say "these are my own servers, run them regardless of registry reachability." I'd like a supported mechanism for that.

Environment

• Copilot CLI 1.0.81-0
• Windows (win32-x64)
• Individual account, no managed/enterprise policy in effect

What happens

https://api.github.com/copilot/mcp_registry is currently returning 503:

HTTP/2.0 503 Service Unavailable
No server is currently available to service your request.

Which produces this in the CLI logs:

[MDM] No managed settings found at C:\Program Files\GitHubCopilot\managed-settings.json
[managedSettings] device MDM: no policy present on this device
[managedSettings] server policy: none for this account (404/empty) from https://github.com
[managedSettings] effective policy resolved: source=none, bypassDisabled=false, serverFetchFailed=false
[WARNING] Failed to fetch MCP registry policy: Failed to fetch MCP registry policy: 503 Service
          Unavailable. Non-default MCP servers will be blocked until the policy can be fetched.

Note the combination: the CLI explicitly resolves source=none — there is no device policy and no server policy for this account — and then still blocks every user-configured server because a separate registry endpoint is unavailable.

Result: 4 locally-defined stdio servers (meshy, blender, game-image-creator, playwright) silently disappear from the session. Only the built-in github-mcp-server remains. The session is unusable for the work it was opened to do, and the only remedy is to wait for a GitHub-side outage to clear.

Why this is the wrong default for local servers

The gate appears to be transport-blind. A stdio server is a local executable that the user already:

1. wrote into their own config file,
2. pointed at a binary on their own disk,
3. runs as a child process under their own uid, with their own env vars.

That is strictly less privileged than the !-shell and arbitrary file-write tools the CLI already grants. Gating it on the reachability of a remote registry doesn't add a meaningful security property for a user with no managed policy — it just converts a GitHub availability blip into a local outage.

Remote/HTTP servers are a different story, and I have no objection to those staying gated.

Requested change

Any one of these would resolve it. Roughly in order of preference:

1. Exempt locally-defined stdio servers from registry-policy gating when no managed policy is in force (source=none). The registry is a supply-chain control for servers the user didn't author; it shouldn't govern a local process the user already fully controls.
2. A user-level trust list, e.g. "trustedMcpServers": ["blender", "playwright"] in settings.json, mirroring the existing disabledMcpServers key. Ignored/overridden whenever a real managed policy is present, so enterprise control is unaffected.
3. Fail open on transient fetch failures specifically (5xx, timeouts, connection errors) when source=none, while continuing to fail closed on an actual policy that denies a server. A 503 is "we don't know", not "denied".

Current config surface

As far as I can tell from the shipped build, the only MCP-related keys accepted are mcpServers (in mcp-config.json) and disabledMcpServers (in settings.json). There's no positive-trust counterpart to disabledMcpServers, and the enforcement itself lives in the native runtime, so there's no user-side escape hatch at all today.

Related

• #2552 — non-default servers blocked after registry policy fetch fails
• #4419 — fail-closed with an empty allow list on an account with no managed policy
• #2486, #2481, #2498, #2479 — the 404 variants of the same fail-closed behavior
• #4364, #4378, #4346 — same failure mode reached via cert / auth / CI token paths

The recurring theme across all of these is that a fetch failure for an absent or irrelevant policy takes down user-owned servers. This issue is the feature-side ask rather than another instance report.

Commencez par localiser le code du runtime natif qui récupère et applique la politique du registre MCP, puis examinez l’analyse de mcp-config.json et settings.json. Reproduisez le cas source=none avec un échec de récupération et comparez les serveurs stdio locaux aux cas distants ou soumis à une politique gérée. Le travail est terminé lorsque le comportement convenu est couvert sans affaiblir l’application des politiques gérées.