Feature: Provide means to use shared memory blob as password (automation, preventing accidental leakage)

_From @heinrich-ulbricht on June 10, 2016 13:3_

This is a feature proposal concerning interoperability and integration with external tools and scripts.

What about a way to pass a password to Cryptomator **without having to enter it manually** (=automation) while **preventing the password from (accidentally) leaking** to log files.

#1 one day probably solves the first requirement: automation. But passing passwords via command line bears the risk of some tools (system log, usual logging tools) capturing the command line and thus the password.

Could we instead provide a pointer to a more volatile location in (shared) memory? Another tool could put the password there and launch Cryptomator with a pointer to the shared memory location. A nice service of Cryptomator could be to erase the memory right after reading the password.

The password thus should be safe from accidental leakage. Only if an attacker explicitly targets this mechanism he would be able to get the password from memory. But usual key loggers, general purpose monitoring tools etc. are no danger anymore.

(Note: key files are no solution for me since even a temporary file might somehow be mirrored by backup software.)

What do you think?

_Copied from original issue: cryptomator/cryptomator#290_

No files, tests, or entry points are named. Start by reviewing the proposal and its reference to issue #1, then define the required interface for passing a shared-memory password, its handling and erasure guarantees, and how completion would demonstrate automation without command-line leakage.

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