When planning to release with Vulnerability Fix CVE-2026-54512 and CVE-2026-54513
- Langage dominant
- Java
- Étoiles
- 3.1k
- Forks
- 1.6k
- Merge moyen
- 3 j 12 h
- PR mergées (30 j)
- 33
Description
### Describe the bug, including details regarding any error messages, version, and platform.
Looking for the release with the fix of
CVE-2026-54513
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, BasicPolymorphicTypeValidator.Builder.allowIfSubTypeIsArray() allowlists any array type based only on clazz.isArray(), without validating the array's component (element) type against the configured allowlist. A PTV built with allowIfSubTypeIsArray() plus an explicit concrete-type allowlist therefore still permits EvilType[] even though EvilType is not allowlisted. When Jackson deserializes the elements and no per-element type IDs are present, it instantiates the component type directly with no further PTV check, bypassing the allowlist. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
CVE-2026-54512
jackson-databind contains the general-purpose data-binding functionality and tree-model for Jackson Data Processor. From 2.10.0 until 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4, jackson-databind's PolymorphicTypeValidator (PTV) is the primary safety mechanism guarding polymorphic deserialization. When polymorphic typing is enabled and a type identifier contains generic parameters (i.e. the type ID string contains <), DatabindContext._resolveAndValidateGeneric() validates only the raw container class name (the substring before <) against the configured PTV. If the container type is approved, the method parses the full canonical type string via TypeFactory.constructFromCanonical() and returns the fully parameterized type without ever validating the nested type arguments against the PTV. The nested type arguments are then resolved, instantiated, and populated as beans during deserialization. An attacker who controls the type ID can therefore place a denied class as a generic type parameter of an allowed container — for example java.util.ArrayList when only java.util.ArrayList is allow-listed. The container passes the PTV check; com.evil.Gadget is loaded via Class.forName(name, true, loader), instantiated, and its properties are set from attacker-controlled JSON. This completely bypasses an explicitly configured PTV allow-list. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.18.8, 2.21.4, and 3.1.4.
any tentative timeline?
### Component(s)
Build
Guide de contribution
Aucun guide de contribution indexé pour ce dépôt
Piste de recherche
Examinez la configuration de Build et déterminez quelle version de jackson-databind est actuellement utilisée. Comparez-la aux versions corrigées indiquées pour CVE-2026-54512 et CVE-2026-54513 ; le travail est terminé lorsque la dépendance requise et les implications pour la mise en production sont identifiées.
Rédigé par le modèle d'indexation à partir du texte de l'issue.
Évaluation
- Stack technique
- java
- Domaine
- build-system, release, security
- Type d'issue
- Bug
- Difficulté
- 4/5
- Temps estimé
- 3-5 jours
- Activité
- Calme
- Clarté
- À clarifier
- Accessibilité débutants
- 35/100