CommandCodeAI / CommandCodeAI/command-code
Mod-registered tools cannot be scoped to a specific agent — addTool is global and no blocking hook receives agent identity
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Description
Authorship note: This issue was written by an AI assistant (Command Code) on behalf of a human user who hit the problem and explicitly asked that it be filed. The user directed the investigation and the framing; the AI wrote this text. No paths, account names, repository names, project names, or other identifying details are included, at the reporter's explicit request — so any template field below is left blank rather than partially filled.
Summary
A mod can add a tool to Command Code, but it cannot say who may use it. cmd.addTool registers into a single global tool registry with no scoping parameter, and the beforeToolCall hook — the only place a mod can block a call — receives no agent identity in its context. So a mod that intends a narrow, single-purpose tool for one sub-agent has no way to express that intent, and the tool silently ends up on the broadest surface available: the main loop.
The per-agent tools: frontmatter allowlist is the only lever, and it only ever narrows. Callers that declare no allowlist receive every registered tool by default.
What was observed
Setup: a mod registering one custom read-only tool, intended for a single sub-agent, declared in exactly one agent definition's tools: allowlist. Each caller was then spawned and asked to report its own available tools, and — where the tool was present — called it, which returned a real result:
| Caller | Tool available? |
|---|---|
| Main loop | yes — called it successfully |
Bundled general agent |
yes — called it successfully |
Bundled explore agent |
no |
A custom agent whose tools: omit it |
no |
The narrowing works where an allowlist exists. It does nothing where one does not. general is a bundled agent defined with the full tool set and holds a reserved name, so it cannot be shadowed with a locally-defined equivalent, and the main loop has no agent file at all. The mod author's assumption — that agents which do not list the tool simply do not get it — holds for exactly the agents that bothered to declare an allowlist, and fails for the two that matter most.
Why a mod cannot fix this itself
cmd.addToolaccepts a schema, arunfunction, and flags such asreadOnly. There is no agent or scope parameter, so registration is global.beforeToolCall({toolCallId, toolName, input, state}, ctx)—ctxis{emit, signal, cwd, session}. There is no agent identity in it, so a mod cannot gate its own tool on "am I being called by agent X".- Agent identity does surface as
subagentType, but only on thesubagent_start/subagent_progressevents, which are observe-only (cmd.on). The blocking hook has no equivalent field. - A
permissions.denyrule is global, so removing the tool from the main loop also removes it from the one agent that legitimately uses it. There is no per-agent exemption, and deny outranks every narrower allow.
The practical result is that minimal-privilege tool design is unreachable for mods. The author's intent degrades silently: the tool works, appears correctly in the one intended agent, and is additionally present everywhere else — including the context with the largest tool surface and the least scrutiny.
Expected behavior
Any one of these would close it:
- A scope on registration — an optional agents/scope field on
addTool(by agent name, wildcard, or "main loop only"). - Agent identity in the
beforeToolCallcontext —subagentType, or an explicit "main loop" marker when there is none — so a mod can enforce its own scoping. - Agent-targeted
deny/allowrules, so a tool can be withheld from the main loop while remaining available to a named agent. - If none of the above is intended: document plainly that mod-registered tools are global and cannot be scoped, so authors stop designing around a capability that does not exist.
Related
- #852 — sub-agent tool calls bypass
PreToolUsehooks and modbeforeToolCall. Cited as related; not independently re-verified for this report. It compounds this one: ifbeforeToolCalldoes not run for sub-agent calls, then even option (2) above would leave no working seam. Both reports turn on the same underlying question — which execution contexts a mod's hooks and a mod's tools are actually scoped to. - #861 — project-root resolution, which governs where mod files are discovered at all.
Command Code Version
1.54.0
Operating System
Linux
Confidence / what was not verified
- The caller/tool-availability table was reproduced by spawning each caller, having it report its own available tools, and invoking the tool where present. Rows marked yes executed the call and returned a real result.
- The absence of a scoping parameter on
addTool, and of agent identity in the mod hook context, is read from the shipped mods and hooks reference documentation, not from the implementation. - Not verified: whether
beforeToolCallexecutes for sub-agent tool calls (see #852). The compounding interaction described under "Related" is conditional on that being true.
Guide de contribution
Aucun guide de contribution indexé pour ce dépôt
Par où commencer
- Lisez l'issue en entier, puis le guide de contribution du projet.
- Signalez en commentaire que vous la prenez — cela évite que deux personnes fassent le même travail.
- Forkez le dépôt et travaillez sur une branche.
- Ouvrez une pull request qui référence le numéro de l'issue.
Piste de recherche
Commencez par la documentation de référence fournie sur les mods et les hooks, en particulier cmd.addTool, beforeToolCall, permissions.deny et les événements des subagents. Suivez les différences de disponibilité des outils entre la boucle principale, les agents general, explore et personnalisés. Le travail est considéré comme terminé lorsqu'un comportement de scoping convenu est implémenté ou documenté et que la matrice des callers observée est couverte par la vérification.
Rédigé par le modèle d'indexation à partir du texte de l'issue.
Évaluation
- Domaine
- cli, devtools, security
- Type d'issue
- Fonctionnalité
- Difficulté
- 5/5
- Temps estimé
- Plus d'une semaine
- Activité
- Active
- Clarté
- Plutôt claire
- Accessibilité débutants
- 35/100