trailofbits / trailofbits/coop
Tamper-evident audit trail of agent actions
Nobody has claimed this yet.
- Dominant language
- Rust
- Stars
- 243
- Forks
- 13
- Avg merge
- 1d 20h
- Merged PRs (30d)
- 30
Description
coop gets "rollback" partly for free (the VM is disposable) but keeps no record of what the agent did.
Proposed. An append-only ledger of security-relevant agent actions — network requests, credential injections (pairs with #411), and optionally file/command activity — captured host-side, outside the guest, so guest root can't tamper with it. An append-only / merkle-tree event log gives tamper-evidence; cryptographic signing of trusted inputs (skills, CLAUDE.md) is a possible extension.
Medium value; independent of the egress/credential work. Related: #2, #411.
Contributor guide
First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
No implementation files, tests, or entry points are named. Start by reviewing the host-side architecture and related issues #2 and #411, then define the security-relevant actions to capture and the tamper-evidence model. Done means an append-only host-side ledger records the agreed agent actions without guest-root modification.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Assessment
- Tech stack
- rust
- Domain
- infrastructure, security
- Issue type
- Feature
- Difficulty
- 5/5
- Estimated time
- Over a week
- Activity status
- Quiet
- Clarity
- Needs clarification
- Newbie friendliness
- 25/100