theupdateframework / theupdateframework/rust-tuf
Properly verify delegated metadata signatures
Nobody has claimed this yet.
- Dominant language
- Rust
- Stars
- 198
- Forks
- 39
- Avg merge
- 9h 19m
- Merged PRs (30d)
- 2
Description
Since the delegating targets defines the valid keys a delegated targets can be signed by, it is possible for delegated targets to be valid when accessed via one target path and invalid when accessed via another. tuf::Tuf currently stores a mapping of role to the delegated targets metadata, but that information is insufficient to know which keys should be used to verify metadata given to update_delegation.
Additionally, tuf::Tuf currently depends on tuf::Client correctly calling update_delegation for every link in the delegation chain when resolving a target. Ideally, tuf::Tuf wouldn't depend on tuf::Client calling APIs in the correct order.
Contributor guide
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First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
Start by reading tuf::Tuf, tuf::Client, and the update_delegation flow. Trace how delegated targets metadata and signing keys are selected across different target paths and delegation-chain calls. Done means verification uses the delegating target's valid keys consistently without depending on tuf::Client calling APIs in a particular order.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Assessment
- Tech stack
- rust
- Domain
- security
- Issue type
- Bug
- Difficulty
- 5/5
- Estimated time
- Over a week
- Activity status
- Stale
- Clarity
- Needs clarification
- Newbie friendliness
- 30/100