Wire Origin validation into the vMCP middleware chain
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- Dominant language
- Go
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- Avg merge
- 1d 15h
- Merged PRs (30d)
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Description
Follow-up from #4908 (Origin header validation for DNS-rebind protection)
#4908 wires the origin validation middleware into the thv run / thv proxy / proxyrunner paths. vMCP composes its own middleware chain (via factory.NewIncomingAuthMiddleware and pkg/vmcp/server/server.go's Handler) and does not reference the origin package, so vMCP-fronted servers do not currently enforce Origin-header validation.
Scope
- Integrate
originvalidation (or the sharedorigin.ResolveAllowedOriginsderivation) into the vMCP incoming middleware chain. - Decide how the allowlist is configured for vMCP (CLI flag / config file / CRD), consistent with the workload-CRD follow-up.
Context
- Middleware + CLI/proxyrunner wiring landed in #4908; the original "vMCP wired" claim was corrected there.
- Relates to the MCP 2025-11-25 §"Security Warning" spec-compliance work.
Contributor guide
First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
Start by reading factory.NewIncomingAuthMiddleware and the Handler in pkg/vmcp/server/server.go, then compare the origin middleware and ResolveAllowedOrigins wiring from #4908. Determine how vMCP should receive its allowlist through the CLI, config file, or CRD, consistent with the workload-CRD follow-up. Done means vMCP-fronted servers enforce Origin-header validation with a documented configuration path.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Assessment
- Tech stack
- go
- Domain
- backend-api-design, security
- Issue type
- Feature
- Difficulty
- 4/5
- Estimated time
- 3-5 days
- Activity status
- Quiet
- Clarity
- Mostly clear
- Newbie friendliness
- 48/100