[Bug]:🐛Prototype-polluting assignment

https://github.com/smartcontractkit/external-adapters-js/blob/c242f89745186dc922bba0f0911d1adfcc9e4354/packages/core/bootstrap/src/lib/modules/overrider.ts#L119-L119

Most JavaScript objects inherit the properties of the built-in Object.prototype object. Prototype pollution is a type of vulnerability in which an attacker is able to modify Object.prototype. Since most objects inherit from the compromised Object.prototype object, the attacker can use this to tamper with the application logic, and often escalate to remote code execution or cross-site scripting.

One way to cause prototype pollution is by modifying an object obtained via a user-controlled property name. Most objects have a special __proto__ property that refers to Object.prototype. An attacker can abuse this special property to trick the application into performing unintended modifications of Object.prototype.

POC

In the vulnerable below, the untrusted value req.params.id is used as the property name req.session.todos[id]. If a malicious user passes in the ID value __proto__, the variable items will then refer to Object.prototype. Finally, the modification of items then allows the attacker to inject arbitrary properties onto Object.prototype.

let express = require('express');
let app = express()

app.put('/todos/:id', (req, res) => {
    let id = req.params.id;
    let items = req.session.todos[id];
    if (!items) {
        items = req.session.todos[id] = {};
    }
    items[req.query.name] = req.query.text;
    res.end(200);
});

One way to fix this is to use Map objects to associate key/value pairs instead of regular objects, as shown below:

let express = require('express');
let app = express()

app.put('/todos/:id', (req, res) => {
    let id = req.params.id;
    let items = req.session.todos.get(id);
    if (!items) {
        items = new Map();
        req.sessions.todos.set(id, items);
    }
    items.set(req.query.name, req.query.text);
    res.end(200);
});

Another way to fix it is to prevent the __proto__ property from being used as a key, as shown below:

let express = require('express');
let app = express()

app.put('/todos/:id', (req, res) => {
    let id = req.params.id;
    if (id === '__proto__' || id === 'constructor' || id === 'prototype') {
        res.end(403);
        return;
    }
    let items = req.session.todos[id];
    if (!items) {
        items = req.session.todos[id] = {};
    }
    items[req.query.name] = req.query.text;
    res.end(200);
});

References

Object.prototype.proto
Map
CWE-78.
CWE-79.
CWE-94.
CWE-400.
CWE-471.
CWE-915.

Start by reading packages/core/bootstrap/src/lib/modules/overrider.ts at line 119 and trace how the property name is obtained and assigned. Verify the chosen change prevents attacker-controlled keys from modifying Object.prototype, and confirm the behavior for the documented prototype-pollution inputs.