Bug: There is no signal, there is no security. Two critical barriers blocking Signal usage in repressive regimes: "censorship circumvention" unavailable before login/registration + phone number verification ALREADY just easily DISABLED by dictator government

Authorization by phone number in Russia is just simply forbidden. It is already disabled in some regions. Others will be banned in the near future. I'm in the Irkutsk region. I've checked several different smartphones with different carriers. Phone number authorization doesn't work for anyone.

And since you can't enable the built-in "Censorship Bypass" from the very beginning of authorization, you have to use a third-party VPN or proxy server. This additional barrier prevents many new users from accessing. But the hassle with VNP/Proxy is not so important, since authorization by phone number is simply forbidden by the dictator.

Because of these two problems, it turns out that the "protected" signal is quite easy to block. There is no signal, and there is no security.

Signal positions itself as a privacy-focused secure messenger, but its current design makes it practically unusable in autocracies and dictatorships where governments aggressively censor and block apps they do not control. In countries like Russia (RF), Iran, and China, authorities tightly control mobile infrastructure, SIM cards, and phone numbers, making phone-number-based registration and login impossible or extremely risky. This is not merely an inconvenience. It is a fundamental flaw that excludes millions of users who need Signal the most. We demand two critical changes:

1. The ability to enable "Censorship Circumvention" mode from the very first launch of the app, before registration or login.
2. Alternative registration and login methods that do not require a phone number.

These features would turn Signal into a genuine lifeline for dissidents, journalists, and ordinary people fighting for freedom, rather than a tool limited to democratic countries. Developers, you built a messenger to "fight evil," yet right now your design is handing victories to authoritarian regimes. This inflexible policy is absurd, infuriating, and self-defeating please fix it now!

Current problems in authoritarian countries:

In Russia, the government is waging war on independent messengers like Signal. Access is already blocked, forcing users to use VPNs just to register or log-in because the "Censorship Circumvention" mode cannot be enabled until after login. This creates a classic catch-22: you need to be logged in to enable circumvention, but you need circumvention enabled to log in! Users are forced to rely on third-party VPNs, which are themselves increasingly targeted and blocked (e.g., ongoing crackdowns on VPNs in Russia).

Recently, Russian authorities escalated further by completely disabling phone number verification because they control the entire mobile network, SIM cards, and telecom infrastructure. They can simply flip a switch to block SMS verification for foreign services.

This pattern is not unique to Russia dictatorships learn from each other. Iran and China already closely monitor and control SIM cards for surveillance and suppression. It is only a matter of time before they adopt the Russian tactic of blocking phone-based registration entirely. Signal’s insistence on phone numbers as the sole identifier plays directly into their hands. What good is end-to-end encryption if the app cannot even be used in places where privacy is a matter of life and death? This design flaw turns Signal into a "democracies-only" tool, leaving oppressed populations with inferior alternatives that are either compromised (e.g., Telegram, which stores data on servers) or dying from blocks (WhatsApp also faces severe restrictions in Russia).

Even in supposedly democratic countries, the situation is deteriorating: EU proposals for mass de-anonymization and expanded internet censorship (e.g., chat control laws) signal future problems. How long before phone-based login becomes a widespread issue everywhere? Developers, this shortsightedness is infuriating Signal should be a beacon of resistance, not a victim of censorship!

Requested features and why they are essential:

1. Enable "Censorship Circumvention" mode on first launch (pre-registration):

   • Make this option available on the very first screen, before any login or registration. Currently it is only accessible after login, which is useless when censorship is already in effect. This would allow immediate use of built-in proxies or domain fronting without requiring external VPNs that governments increasingly hunt down.

     Benefit for Signal:

     • Immediate accessibility: Users in blocked regions often cannot even open the app without workarounds let them enable circumvention right away.
     • Improved security: Built-in circumvention is safer than third-party VPNs, which can be compromised or logged.
     • Resilience: In countries like China (Great Firewall) or Iran (internet shutdowns), this would make Signal robust rather than fragile. Dictatorships evolve Signal must evolve too.

2. Alternative registration and login without phone numbers:

   • Allow options such as email, username/password, or even hardware keys (similar to Session or Briar). WhatsApp already supports email-based registration in Russia without the sky falling spammers did not take over, and security did not collapse. Why does Signal remain so stubbornly opposed? Phone numbers are relics of repressive systems: government-issued identifiers that enable tracking and blocking. By mandating them, you force users to expose themselves or give up entirely.

     Benefit for Signal:

     • Greater anonymity: In dictatorships, tying accounts to phone numbers dooms users to surveillance. Alternatives would let people communicate without linking their identity to state-controlled systems aligning with Signal’s privacy principles.
     • Spam protection: Use CAPTCHA, email verification, or rate-limiting solutions other apps handle successfully.
     • Global reach: Billions live under authoritarian rule; excluding them contradicts Signal’s mission. Think of activists in Belarus, Myanmar, or Hong Kong they need tools that work despite obstacles, not ones that fold at the first barrier.
     • Precedent from competitors: Apps like Threema and Wire offer phone-free options and thrive. Signal’s refusal feels like arrogance rather than principle.

Developers, this is not just a mistake it feels like a betrayal! You promised a secure messenger that would protect the most vulnerable, yet your "phone-only" dogma is letting tyrants win. How does it feel knowing that in Russia people risk arrest simply for trying to use your app, only to hit a wall because of your inflexible design? It is maddening, heartbreaking, and frankly foolish! "You were supposed to fight evil, not join it!"

We are losing freedom everywhere governments strip rights, censor speech, and monitor everyone. Signal could be our shield, but instead it gathers dust in app stores in oppressed countries. Enough stubbornness!

Give us phone-free registration alternatives! Let us enable circumvention from the very start! Make Signal truly global, not just for comfortable democracies. If you do this, watch what happens: in Russia, where WhatsApp and Telegram face growing block threats, users will flock to Signal. Your metrics will skyrocket millions of downloads, explosive active user growth. The PR will be phenomenal: "Signal: not just secure, but censorship-resilient." The world will see you as heroes standing against dictators, driving even greater adoption globally.

Ignore this, and Signal risks becoming irrelevant another "secure" app that fails when tested against real-world tyranny.

Do it for journalists evading arrest, for underground protest networks, for families staying connected during blackouts. Stand up make these changes now! The clock is ticking, and dictators won’t wait.

#MakeSignalResilient

Screenshots

No response

Device

Xiaomi Poco f6

Android version

Android 15

Signal version

7.73.2

Link to debug log

No response

Start by reviewing the Android onboarding and authentication entry points, along with the existing Censorship Circumvention setting mentioned in the issue. Define separately how pre-registration circumvention and phone-free registration would work, including their security and abuse implications. Done would require an agreed design, implementation scope, and tests covering both requested flows.