Native Android Seccomp Limitations
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- Dominant language
- C++
- Stars
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Description
Because rr uses its "own syscalls", rr encounters immediate runtime failures from bad syscalls on native Android devices (e.g., within Termux).
While Android does support seccomp filtering, its security model (since Android OS 8) only allows filtering of valid syscalls. Invalid numbers will cause SIGSYS regardless of seccomp filtering.
It's still possible to setup signal/exception handlers and capture SIGSYS, so I thought about attempting this; however, I'm not familiar enough with rr's codebase, and whether that would break how rr inspects, records, etc., and did not want to waste time implementing something if so.
Contributor guide
First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
No files, tests, or entry points are identified in the issue. First trace rr's syscall handling and recording paths on native Android, then determine whether SIGSYS handling can preserve inspection and replay behavior. Done means rr no longer fails immediately on Android's invalid-syscall restrictions without breaking recording or inspection.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Assessment
- Tech stack
- android, cpp, linux
- Domain
- devtools, operating-systems
- Issue type
- Feature
- Difficulty
- 5/5
- Estimated time
- Over a week
- Activity status
- Stale
- Clarity
- Needs clarification
- Newbie friendliness
- 25/100