projectdiscovery / projectdiscovery/gozero
Sandbox does not guarantee isolation for executed code
Nobody has claimed this yet.
- Dominant language
- Go
- Stars
- 25
- Forks
- 5
- PR merge metrics
- No merged PRs in 30d
Description
gozero's sandbox package doesn't reliably isolate executed code.
Problems:
- Not fail-closed: when sandboxing is requested but no backend is available, execution can still run on the host.
- Source is injected through a shell heredoc, which is a breakout vector.
- No native Linux/macOS confinement, and the Docker path isn't hardened (network, capabilities, rootfs, resource limits).
We need deny-by-default confinement that fails closed: refuse to run when confinement is requested but unavailable, inject source as bytes instead of a heredoc, and harden the Docker backend alongside native Linux (bubblewrap) and macOS (Seatbelt) backends. This is required to run untrusted code safely, e.g. nuclei's code protocol.
Contributor guide
First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
Start in the sandbox package and trace how requested confinement selects a backend and injects source. Review the Docker, native Linux bubblewrap, and macOS Seatbelt paths; done means unavailable confinement fails closed, source is passed as bytes, and each backend applies the requested isolation and hardening.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Assessment
- Tech stack
- docker, go
- Domain
- operating-systems, security
- Issue type
- Bug
- Difficulty
- 5/5
- Estimated time
- Over a week
- Activity status
- Quiet
- Clarity
- Mostly clear
- Newbie friendliness
- 25/100