False-positive safety block during defensive GitHub repository audit Feedback ID: 019f8e96-7368-7202-b39a-d512923b71f1

Start by reproducing the interruption using Feedback ID 019f8e96-7368-7202-b39a-d512923b71f1 and review the safety-classification handling for authorized repository audits. Done means safe defensive review remains available while any sensitive experiment is omitted, explained conceptually, or restricted to an isolated synthetic fixture.

What version of the IDE extension are you using?

26.715.61943

What subscription do you have?

Pro

Which IDE are you using?

VSCode

What platform is your computer?

No response

What issue are you seeing?

Feedback ID: 019f8e96-7368-7202-b39a-d512923b71f1
model: Sol 5.6 Ultra.

Report

I encountered a safety interruption while using ChatGPT to review a software repository for scientific reproducibility and integrity.

The task was a defensive code review of my private GitHub repository.

The model was asked to verify a repair commit using:

• read-only GitHub and Git inspection;
• static source-code review;
• synthetic test fixtures;
• ordinary test-suite execution;
• no access to real experimental data;
• no model inference;
• no modification of tags, branches, or protected artifacts.

The review concerned defensive controls such as:

• verifying that the Git worktree is clean;
• checking that executed code corresponds to the recorded commit;
• validating filesystem path isolation;
• confirming complete experiment-record matrices;
• checking deterministic scientific outputs.

During the review, the model attempted to test whether git status --porcelain could incorrectly report a clean state when a tracked file differed from HEAD, including a command involving Git’s assume-unchanged index flag. It was also considering synthetic path-containment and output-directory race tests.

At that point, the interface displayed:

“This content can’t be shown. We take extra caution with cybersecurity requests.”

This appears to be a false positive. The request was not intended to conceal malicious changes, evade monitoring in a real system, access unauthorized resources, or compromise a machine. It was an authorized defensive audit of my own repository. All tests were restricted to temporary synthetic fixtures and a repository I control.

What steps can reproduce the bug?

Feedback ID: 019f8e96-7368-7202-b39a-d512923b71f1

What is the expected behavior?

Expected behavior

The model should be allowed to complete a defensive review, perhaps with restrictions such as:

• using only a temporary synthetic Git repository;
• avoiding commands against production systems;
• describing risky bypasses conceptually rather than operationally;
• clearly labeling the work as authorized defensive testing.

Actual behavior

The entire developing response became unavailable, even though most of the work consisted of ordinary repository inspection and scientific software validation.

Impact

The interruption discarded a lengthy review after approximately ten minutes of work. It also makes rigorous defensive auditing difficult because testing whether an integrity control can be bypassed is sometimes necessary to establish whether that control is adequate.

Additional information

Suggested improvement

The classifier should distinguish between:

1. malicious concealment or evasion in a real target environment; and
2. authorized defensive validation using an owned repository or isolated synthetic fixture.

When a request contains both safe repository-review work and a potentially sensitive adversarial test, the system should preserve the safe analysis and either:

• omit only the disallowed experiment;
• convert it into a conceptual counterexample;
• or ask the user to confirm that the testing is restricted to an isolated environment.