nspcc-dev / nspcc-dev/neofs-api
HMAC-based verification of container-local requests
Nobody has claimed this yet.
- Dominant language
- Makefile
- Stars
- 11
- Forks
- 15
- Avg merge
- 2d 8h
- Merged PRs (30d)
- 9
Description
After #406 we'd get a single signature for a request, but this still means ~0.2ms spent per request for signing and verifying it. That's OK for forwarded requests, but for local (ttl=1) in-container requests nodes can establish a shared secret (session-alike mechanism) and then use lighter HMAC-based proof for request authenticity.
Contributor guide
First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
No files or tests are named. Start by reviewing issue #406 and the request-authentication flow it describes, then determine where ttl=1 in-container requests are handled. Done means local nodes can establish a shared secret and use HMAC-based authenticity proof while forwarded requests retain the existing signing path.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Assessment
- Domain
- cryptography, distributed-systems, security
- Issue type
- Feature
- Difficulty
- 5/5
- Estimated time
- Over a week
- Activity status
- Quiet
- Clarity
- Needs clarification
- Newbie friendliness
- 25/100