mathiasbynens / mathiasbynens/dotfiles
git prompt branch name code injection possibility?
Nobody has claimed this yet.
- Dominant language
- Shell
- Stars
- 31.5k
- Forks
- 8.4k
- PR merge metrics
- No merged PRs in 30d
Description
after reading your git prompt code and comparing it to the official git-prompt.sh i'm not sure your code doesn't suffer from an injection vulnerability with a specially crafted ref name.
if you think that's not the case just close this issue
Contributor guide
No contributing guide indexed for this repository
First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
Start with .bash_prompt around line 50 and compare it with contrib/completion/git-prompt.sh around line 309. Check how specially crafted ref names are incorporated into the prompt and whether they can be interpreted by the shell. Done means either a demonstrated vulnerability with a scoped fix or a documented reason the behavior is safe.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Assessment
- Tech stack
- bash, git, shell
- Domain
- cli, security
- Issue type
- Bug
- Difficulty
- 4/5
- Estimated time
- 3-5 days
- Activity status
- Quiet
- Clarity
- Needs clarification
- Newbie friendliness
- 35/100