Autonat confidence via diverse network segments?
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Description
I talked with @jacobheun a while ago about autonat and he mentioned that when considering autonat responses we should ensure that we don't accept multiple responses from different peers in the same network segment. This is to prevent an attack whereby an attacker could trivially spin up multiple nodes on the same host or service provider, trick you into trying to use them for autonat which may then give them control over what you think is your external address.
This isn't in the spec, which does mention some specific mitigations for other attacks.
Should it be added? If so, what is the behaviour of existing implementations around this?
Would something like the first octet of their IP being different be sufficient?
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First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
Start by reviewing the autonat portion of the specification and the described mitigations for related attacks. Compare the behavior of existing implementations, then determine whether network-segment diversity should be added and how it should be defined. Done means reaching a decision that can be documented in the specification.
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Assessment
- Domain
- networking, security
- Issue type
- Feature
- Difficulty
- 5/5
- Estimated time
- Over a week
- Activity status
- Stale
- Clarity
- Needs clarification
- Newbie friendliness
- 25/100