Eclipse robust DHT using expected ID distribution

It may be possible to make a DHT robust against eclipse attacks by using expected distribution of node IDs.

In a DHT, nodes are expected to be evenly distributed around the node ID space. In a DHT with an active eclipse attack, one would expect a large cluster of node IDs around the target key.

Instead of using K as the bucket size, one could use expected ID distribution. For example, in a network with 10K nodes, one would expect:

• 1 node to share logtwo(10,000) = 13 at least bits.
• 2 nodes to share at least 12 bits.
• ...
• 20 nodes to share at least 8-9 nits (logtwo(network size) - logtwo(K))

So, instead of putting to the closest 20 peers, you'd calculate the expected network size (e.g., by asking other peers how close their neighbors are and assuming a uniform network), then put to all peers sharing the expected number of bits (in this case, 8).

No files, tests, or implementation entry points are identified. Start by reviewing the DHT routing and peer-selection design, then determine how expected node-ID distribution could be estimated and validated against eclipse attacks. Done means a decided design with an agreed implementation scope and tests or evaluation criteria.