libp2p nodes vulnerable to OOM attack
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- Dominant language
- C++
- Stars
- 492
- Forks
- 130
- PR merge metrics
- No merged PRs in 30d
Description
Summary
This can occur because when a signed peer record is received, only the signature validity check is performed but the sender signature is not checked. Signed peer records from randomly generated peers can be sent by a malicious actor. A target node will accept the peer record as long as the signature is valid, and then stored in the peer store.
Expected behavior
reject peer on peer ID mismatch
Actual behavior
saved the mismatched peer
Relevant log output
Possible Solution
reject peer on peer ID mismatch
Version
No response
Would you like to work on fixing this bug ?
Yes
Contributor guide
No contributing guide indexed for this repository
First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
The issue names no files, tests, or entry points. Start by tracing signed peer record handling through peer ID validation and the peer store; done means a peer record with a mismatched peer ID is rejected rather than saved.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Assessment
- Tech stack
- cpp
- Domain
- networking, security
- Issue type
- Bug
- Difficulty
- 4/5
- Estimated time
- 3-5 days
- Activity status
- Stale
- Clarity
- Needs clarification
- Newbie friendliness
- 35/100