github remote keybase:// is actually less secure than ssh://git@github ?

Keybase does not seem to address the same security model as PGP / SSH, and this can be misleading to users.

PGP and SSH both have strong-passphrase recommendations, so that even if a user gains access (remote or local) to your machine (and therefore likely your id_rsa, gpg keys), you are protected from them accessing your encrypted files or server connections while posing as you.

Keybase is harmful to protections against that threat model by:

- Providing password-less access to keychains (a remote or local user needs only to `run_keybase`)
- Providing identity chain destruction with zero identity confirmation ( #3135 )

The first one is particularly damaging, because one can ` git clone` any repository after running `run_keybase` *without any password or identity confirmation*. The data is then presented unencrypted to the user. The fact that this is stored in plaintext on the hard drive *could* be written off as "Encrypted git protects against server intrusion only".

But for device-level intrusion, what mechanism exists to revoke device access to an encrypted github repository or prevent malicious modifications to server-stored data? Effectively none, beyond " Keep your device secure "?

No source file, test, or entry point is named. Start by reviewing the Keybase Git remote behavior and the threat model described in the issue, then read the related issue #3135. Done should be an agreed mitigation for device-level access and identity confirmation.

Written by the indexing model from the issue text.