Verify integrity of the downloaded content
- Dominant language
- TypeScript
- Stars
- 79
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- 12
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Description
Hey,
My name is Maciej Mensfeld, and I do supply chain security research at Mend.io.
I've noticed, that this library downloads external binaries and uses them. While it's a common pattern, integrity verification is lacking here.
This is described as [CWE-494](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/494.html).
You could verify the integrity of the downloaded file before using it by comparing the file hash to a hardcoded, expected file hash.
This is essentially what package managers do to verify the integrity of downloaded packages.
Doing this would prevent attack scenarios in which the binaries downloaded [here](https://my.diffend.io/npm/hyper-nano/1.2.0#d2h-073898-3042) are manipulated.
If the verification happens elsewhere sorry in advance and I would love it if you could point me to the location, so I can tune up my scanning engine.
Have a great day :)
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