RUSTSEC-2026-0049: CRLs not considered authoritative by Distribution Point due to faulty matching logic

| Details | |
| --- | --- |
| Package | `rustls-webpki` |
| Version | `0.102.8` |
| URL | n/a |
| Patched Versions | >=0.103.10 |
| Unaffected Versions | <0.102.0-alpha.0 |
| Aliases | [GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4](https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4) |

If a certificate had more than one `distributionPoint`, then only the first `distributionPoint` would be considered against each CRL's `IssuingDistributionPoint` `distributionPoint`, and then the certificate's subsequent `distributionPoint`s would be ignored.

The impact was that correctly provided CRLs would not be consulted to check revocation. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Deny` (the default) this would lead to incorrect but safe `Error::UnknownRevocationStatus`. With `UnknownStatusPolicy::Allow` this would lead to inappropriate acceptance of revoked certificates.

This vulnerability is thought to be of limited impact. This is because both the certificate and CRL are signed -- an attacker would need to compromise a trusted issuing authority to trigger this bug. An attacker with such capabilities could likely bypass revocation checking through other more impactful means (such as publishing a valid, empty CRL.)

More likely, this bug would be latent in normal use, and an attacker could leverage faulty revocation checking to continue using a revoked credential.

This vulnerability is identified as [GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4](https://github.com/rustls/webpki/security/advisories/GHSA-pwjx-qhcg-rvj4). Thank you to @1seal for the report.