[aw] UK AI Advisory / Resilience reported incomplete result

### Workflow Failure

**Workflow:** [UK AI Advisory / Resilience](https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw-cao/blob/main/.github/workflows/uk-ai-advisory-operational-resilience.md)
**Branch:** main
**Run:** https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw-cao/actions/runs/34450630890

> [!WARNING]
> **Task Could Not Be Completed**: The agent reported that the task could not be performed due to an infrastructure or tool failure.

**Reasons:**
- Required alert evidence inaccessible for target repository; code scanning, secret scanning, and Dependabot alerts returned 403 and metadata did not establish disabled state

Executive summary: INCOMPLETE. I verified the current GOV.UK guidance and analyzed the authoritative `target/` checkout for `githubnext/gh-aw-workshop` over the fixed seven-day window, but I could not complete minimum-standard verification because required repository alert evidence was inaccessible. Prefetch showed 403 responses for code scanning, secret scanning, and Dependabot alerts, while repository metadata did not establish that those controls were disabled rather than merely unauthorized. Under the package contract, that blocks a bounded operational-resilience advisory from being completed without inference.

**Action:** Control-plane operator should rerun with credentials that can read the target repository's code scanning, secret scanning, and Dependabot alert state, or provide authoritative metadata proving those features are disabled; acceptance check: the next run can classify those controls as observed-enabled, observed-disabled, or accessible alert evidence instead of inaccessible.

### Advisory Status
INCOMPLETE

### Scope and Evidence
- Observed: authoritative checkout at `target/`; repository is public and active; substantial changes landed in the last seven days across `.github/agents`, `.github/skills`, `.github/workflows`, scripts, and workshop content; no `SECURITY.md` was present in observed repository files; current UK guidance page at `https://www.gov.uk/guidance/ai-open-code-and-vulnerability-risk-in-the-public-sector` was successfully fetched and reviewed.
- Inaccessible: code scanning alerts API, secret scanning alerts API, and Dependabot alerts API all returned 403 in prefetch; `security_and_analysis` fields were null, so disabled-vs-inaccessible was not established from metadata.
- Out-of-repository evidence required for completion: ownership and on-call arrangements, patch SLAs, inbound vulnerability handling process, observability coverage, rollback/recovery capability, and any open-code exception record.

### Asset Graph
Observed changed surfaces indicate a workflow-heavy public teaching repository with recent modifications to:
- agent definitions under `.github/agents/`
- reusable skills under `.github/skills/`
- multiple GitHub Actions workflows under `.github/workflows/`
- Node/package manifests and automation scripts
- workshop instructional content, including security and resilience topics

These surfaces increase the importance of accessible automated alert evidence because recent changes touch automation, dependencies, and instructional material that may influence downstream adopters.

### Proposed Tier Classification
none — capped pending evidence. A/B/C/D scoring was not completed because minimum-standard verification could not determine the state of required automated vulnerability and secret-exposure controls.

### Control Verification Gaps
- Required alert evidence unavailable for code scanning, secret scanning, and Dependabot alerts.
- No observed `SECURITY.md` or other clearly visible inbound vulnerability reporting route in the checked-out files reviewed.
- Ownership, patch SLA, observability, rollback, and recovery evidence were not observable from repository contents alone.

### Risk Scoring and Rationale
Not completed. The package instructions require reporting incomplete when alert APIs are unavailable and metadata does not establish whether features are disabled or unauthorized.

### Prioritized Remediation Queue
1. Restore authoritative visibility into repository security alert posture (code scanning, secret scanning, Dependabot) or expose metadata proving controls are intentionally disabled.
- Urgency: high
- Owner: control-plane operator / repository administrator authority required
- Validation evidence: a follow-up run can read alert states or authoritative disabled-state metadata for all three controls
- Review trigger: once access is restored or disabled-state evidence is available

### Recommended Next Action
First, restore authoritative evidence for the repository's automated alerting controls, because without that data the advisory cannot distinguish an operational control gap from a permissions gap and therefore cannot safely classify resilience posture or prioritize remediation by risk.

Agent prompt

Assess and restore evidentiary access for the target repository's automated security hygiene controls. Determine whether code scanning, secret scanning, and Dependabot alerts are enabled and readable for the advisory workflow, or are intentionally disabled with authoritative metadata. Do not change repository code. If permissions are missing, update the workflow credential or installation scope so the next advisory run can read those three alert categories. If a control is intentionally disabled, record that state in authoritative repository metadata or equivalent control-plane evidence that the advisory workflow can read. Completion evidence: a rerun can classify each of the three controls as observed-enabled with accessible alerts, or observed-disabled from metadata, with no 403 ambiguity.

### Open-Code Exception Register
none

### Operational Metrics Baseline
- Open-alert age against stated patch SLA: inaccessible
- Inbound vulnerability reporting route: no `SECURITY.md` observed; other route not evidenced
- Ownership coverage: not evidenced from observed files reviewed
- Unsupported dependency ratio: not established from observed evidence reviewed
- Exception aging: none evidenced
- Exposure without recovery capability: not established from repository evidence alone

### Human Review Required
- Repository administrator or control-plane owner to confirm whether 403 alert responses reflect missing authorization or intentionally unavailable features.
- Maintainer to confirm ownership, patch/remediation SLA, observability coverage, rollback path, and vulnerability intake route.
- Human reviewer to rerun the advisory after evidence access is restored before using any tiering decision.

### Control Plane
- Correlation ID: `34450229425-171`
- Central repository: `githubnext/gh-aw-cao`
- Control-plane run URL: https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw-cao/actions/runs/34450630890

This is a structured incompletion signal (`report_incomplete`), not a real task outcome. Any other safe outputs emitted alongside this signal (e.g., comments) describe the failure state, not a completed review or action.

### Action Required

**Assign this issue to an agent** to debug and fix the issue.

Debug with any coding agent

Use this prompt with any coding agent (GitHub Copilot, Claude, Gemini, etc.):

````
Debug the agentic workflow failure using https://raw.githubusercontent.com/github/gh-aw/main/debug.md

The failed workflow run is at https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw-cao/actions/runs/34450630890
````

Manually invoke the agent

Debug this workflow failure using your favorite Agent CLI and the `agentic-workflows` prompt.

- Start your agent
- Load the `agentic-workflows` skill from `.github/skills/agentic-workflows/SKILL.md` or
- Type `debug the agentic workflow uk-ai-advisory-operational-resilience failure in https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw-cao/actions/runs/34450630890`

> [!TIP]
>
> Stop reporting this workflow as a failure
>
> To stop a workflow from creating failure issues, set `report-failure-as-issue: false` in its frontmatter:
> ```yaml
> safe-outputs:
> report-failure-as-issue: false
> ```
>
>

> Generated from [UK AI Advisory / Resilience](https://github.com/githubnext/gh-aw-cao/actions/runs/34450630890) · pi · 102.1 AIC · [◷](https://github.com/search?q=repo%3Agithubnext%2Fgh-aw-cao+is%3Aissue+%22gh-aw-workflow-id%3A+uk-ai-advisory-operational-resilience%22&type=issues)
> - [x] expires on Sep 17, 2026, 7:40 AM UTC

Start with .github/workflows/uk-ai-advisory-operational-resilience.md and the agentic-workflows skill at .github/skills/agentic-workflows/SKILL.md; use the linked failed run and debug.md as the entry points. Investigate access to code scanning, secret scanning, and Dependabot alert evidence without changing repository code. Done means a rerun classifies all three controls as accessible or authoritatively disabled, with no 403 ambiguity.

Written by the indexing model from the issue text.