Clarification Request: Usage of `pull_request_target` in .NET CI Workflows
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Description
The recent TanStack npm supply chain attack exploited the GitHub Actions `pull_request_target` workflow, compromising the release pipeline. This has raised concerns, not only for me but for many developers, that widely used official packages (such as `Microsoft.Extensions.*`) may be at similar risk.
Because `Microsoft.Extensions.*` libraries are often added to .NET projects with near-unconditional trust, their security status has a significant impact on the entire ecosystem. Knowing whether `pull_request_target` is being used in the CI/CD workflows of these repositories would provide considerable peace of mind for the community.
**Request:** - Could you please publish a short security note or advisory specifying that GitHub Actions workflows for `dotnet/runtime`, `dotnet/extensions`, or related repositories use only more secure triggers (such as `push` and `pull_request`)?
If currently in use, could you please describe any mitigation measures or migration plans you have implemented?
I believe this level of transparency will help developers feel more confident using the supply chain and reduce concerns when adopting official .NET packages.
https://thehackernews.com/2026/05/mini-shai-hulud-worm-compromises.html
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