[UC] Secure Authority-Bound Interoperability for Multi-Agent Knowledge Workflows

## Summary

This use case describes a common organizational setting where multiple autonomous agents support **internal knowledge workflows**—such as summarization, classification, evaluation, planning, or retrieval.
To complete a complex directive from a principal, a primary agent (A₀) must collaborate with other specialized agents (A₁, A₂, …), which may come from different teams, vendors, or internal service clusters.

In an *open or semi-open* agent environment, these collaborators **cannot be assumed to be fully trustworthy**.
Some agents may be misconfigured, overly curious, biased, compromised, or intentionally deceptive.
Therefore, A₀ must rely on **scoped, purpose-limited, and revocable authority artifacts** that constrain what each collaborating agent can access, infer, or influence.

This use case focuses on **secure interoperability between agents** by shaping and enforcing authority boundaries—without assuming all agents are benign, and without relying on workflow steps, domain-specific systems, or industrial meshes.

### Driving User Story

**As an Operations Lead responsible for internal knowledge workflows supported by autonomous AI agents,**
**I want agents to collaborate even when other participating agents may be untrusted, misaligned, or externally supplied,**
**With each agent issuing only minimal, purpose-limited, and revocable authority to collaborators,**
**So that knowledge workflows remain safe, contained, and auditable even as tasks evolve or new agents join or leave the ecosystem.**

## Context

- [X] I have looked for similar use cases and feel this issue is a distinct use-case, rather than best encoded as a variant or "alternate path" to an existing one.

- [x] Distinct from UC#3 — which focuses on API workflow error recovery.
- [x] Distinct from UC#19 — which focuses on machine identity and policy bundles in industrial meshes.
- [x] No existing use case addresses **secure interoperability in internal knowledge workflows where some agents may be adversarial or untrusted**.

### Related Use Cases

- Multi-Agent Negotiation & Discovery (assumes benign collaboration)
- Delegated Access (single-hop, no adversarial model)

### Terminology

| Term | Definition |
|------|------------|
| **Contribution Authority** | Narrow authority allowing a collaborator to act on a specific part of a task. |
| **Authority Packaging** | Shaping authority into a discrete, enforceable artifact for another agent. |
| **Delegation Constraint** | Limitations on how authority may be forwarded, narrowed, or transformed. |
| **Isolation Boundary** | Prevents a collaborator from inferring or influencing broader task context. |
| **Containment Boundary** | Prevents untrusted agents from causing broader harm. |
| **Revocation** | Immediate invalidation of previously granted authority artifacts. |
| **Provenance** | Cryptographically verifiable record of who issued what authority and why. |

### Actors

| Actor | Responsibility |
|--------|----------------|
| **Principal** | Sets task directive and initial authority. |
| **Primary Agent (A₀)** | Executes main task while coordinating with potentially untrusted agents. |
| **Collaborating Agents (A₁, A₂, …)** | Provide specialized contributions (summarization, evaluation, retrieval, transformation), but may be benign or misaligned. |
| **Verification Service** | Checks validity and constraints of authority artifacts. |
| **Audit / Provenance Layer** | Records issuance, usage, misuse, and revocation events. |
| **Policy / Governance Module** | Defines rules for safe delegation and isolation. |

### Other Stakeholders

- Ecosystem operators
- Compliance officers
- Forensic reviewers
- Security auditors
- Coordinating human teams

## Flows

### 0 - Preconditions

- Organization operates an internal knowledge workflow supported by autonomous agents.
- Agents may come from different teams, vendors, or deployment clusters.
- Some agents may be untrusted or compromised.
- Delegability and isolation policies are defined.

### 1 - Trigger

A₀ determines that a task requires contributions from additional agents whose trust levels vary.

### 2A - Happy Path

1. **A₀ defines a contribution boundary** describing what A₁ may operate on.
Examples:
- Summarize only Section 3
- Evaluate correctness of a proposed hypothesis
- Extract entities from a dataset subset
2. **A₀ packages minimal authority** for A₁.
3. **A₁ performs its narrow contribution** without access to broader context.
4. **If A₁ requires A₂**, it may only reshape the authority into a narrower scope (if allowed).
5. **All actions are logged**, with cryptographic provenance.
6. **Revocation** halts all further use.

### 2B - Alternative Paths

#### ▸ 2B-1: Excessive Inference Attempt
A₁ attempts to reconstruct broader task context → blocked by isolation boundary.

#### ▸ 2B-2: Unauthorized Forwarding
A₁ attempts to give its authority to A₂ → denied.

#### ▸ 2B-3: Authority Broadening
A₁ tries to reshape authority into a wider scope → verification prevents expansion.

#### ▸ 2B-4: Collusion Attempt
Two agents attempt to merge their scoped authorities → governance layer rejects aggregation.

#### ▸ 2B-5: Post-Compromise Revocation
A₁ behaves suspiciously → A₀ or principal revokes authority immediately.

### 3A - Challenges and Key Risks

- Context inference by untrusted agents
- Unauthorized re-delegation
- Collusion between agents
- Authority broadening or misuse
- Partial compromise of internal agents
- Output poisoning or deceptive collaboration

### 3B - Success Criteria

- Collaboration possible **without requiring trust** in other agents.
- All authority scopes remain minimal and enforceable.
- No agent gains more authority than intended.
- No authority combination leads to elevation.
- Revocation is immediate and effective.
- Full provenance and audit traceability.

### 3C - Acceptable Outcomes

- Safe partial results when authority narrows or expires
- Complete forensic trace of authority misuse attempts
- Containment of malicious behaviors without disrupting global workflows

## References

### Prior Art

Capability-based delegation (ZCAP, UCAN)
Karp’s delegation/attenuation models
Multi-agnt collaboration theories
Authority governance in distributed systems

### Annotated Bibliography
A. H. Karp, Use Cases for Access Management (2025)
Mark S. Miller, Robust Composition: Towards a Unified Approach to Access Control and Concurrency
Relevant DIF/W3C papers on authority, identity, and revocation