A detector for [ERC-7562](https://eips.ethereum.org/EIPS/eip-7562) banned opcodes reachable from an ERC-4337 validation function (`validateUserOp`, `validatePaymasterUserOp`), following internal calls, library calls and modifiers.

### Describe the desired feature

## Why

ERC-7562 is enforced by bundlers, off-chain, in a tracer. **Nothing on-chain enforces it.** A paymaster that reads `block.timestamp` during validation compiles, passes its tests, passes a real `EntryPoint.handleOps` call, and is then dropped by every bundler in production, after it has been deployed and staked. Nothing a developer runs before deploying catches it today.

## What Slither catches today

`tx-origin` does flag the ORIGIN case when the read sits in a conditional, for its own phishing
reason. The rest is missed. On a paymaster that stores `block.timestamp` into its returned
context and checks `block.number` in a modifier:

```
$ slither Overlap.sol --detect timestamp,tx-origin,weak-prng
INFO:Slither:Overlap.sol analyzed (2 contracts with 3 detectors), 0 result(s) found
```

`timestamp` fires on comparisons and `weak-prng` on a modulo; these are an assignment and a
modifier. Nine more banned opcodes have no coverage in this context, and no detector models
"reachable from a validation entry point", which is what decides whether the contract works.

## Scope (v1)

OP-011 opcodes (TIMESTAMP, NUMBER, COINBASE, PREVRANDAO, GASLIMIT, BASEFEE, BLOBBASEFEE, ORIGIN,
GASPRICE, BLOCKHASH, BLOBHASH, SELFDESTRUCT) including inline-assembly spellings, plus OP-080
BALANCE reported with its staked-entity condition. Entry points matched by name, so a contract
that declares its own interface with a wrong argument list is still checked. GAS, CREATE/CREATE2
and the storage rules are left out: they need data flow to avoid false positives. Medium impact,
High confidence.

## Evidence

Working implementation, with fixtures and snapshot tests on solc 0.5.16 and 0.8.26.

| Target | Result |
|---|---|
| `eth-infinitism/account-abstraction` v0.8.0, all contracts | **0 findings** |
| A widely deployed production paymaster | **1 finding**: an ORIGIN read enforcing a bundler allowlist |

The second is a documented trade-off rather than a bug, since the read is gated behind a flag
that operators set per operation. It is also a fair statement of the limitation: the detector
reports reachability and cannot see that the read is optional.

Start by reviewing Slither's existing timestamp, tx-origin, and weak-prng detectors, then examine the working implementation, fixtures, and snapshot tests mentioned in the issue. Validate the detector against solc 0.5.16 and 0.8.26 and the listed account-abstraction and paymaster targets. Done means the scoped OP-011 and OP-080 cases are reported through validation entry points while the explicitly excluded rules remain out of scope.

Written by the indexing model from the issue text.