Dealing with broadband routers and consumer IoT devices that hijack the DNS

Hi,

consumer broadband routers [[A](https://www.telekom.de/hilfe/festnetz-internet-tv/anschluss-verfuegbarkeit/anschlussvarianten/allgemein/konfigurationsseite-speedport-wird-nicht-angezeigt), [B](https://avm.de/service/fritzbox/fritzbox-7590/wissensdatenbank/publication/show/1_Benutzeroberflache-der-FRITZ-Box-aufrufen/), [C](https://www.vodafone.it/portal/Aziende/Partita-IVA/Supporto/ADSL-e-Rete-Fissa/Station-e-altri-dispositivi/Vodafone-Station-Revolution/Pannello-di-controllo-station-revolution)] and some IoT devices hijack the DNS for convenient web interface access.


Examples include:
```
http://speedport.ip --> http://192.168.2.1

http://fritz.box --> http://192.168.178.1

http://vodafone.station --> http://192.168.1.1
```

Should we add such cases to the [quirks/websites-with-shared-credential-backends](https://github.com/apple/password-manager-resources/blob/master/quirks/websites-with-shared-credential-backends.json)?

Best,
Max

Review quirks/websites-with-shared-credential-backends.json and the linked router examples first. Determine whether the listed hostnames belong in that resource, then ensure the resulting entries represent the Speedport, FRITZ!Box, and Vodafone Station cases described in the issue and that the JSON remains valid.

Written by the indexing model from the issue text.