[Bug] Cyber policy false positive on defensive security tool's own regression tests

**Bug Description**
Subject: False positive — "cyber" flag on a defensive security tool's own regression tests

This session is being flagged under the cyber/security policy. The flag is a false positive, and I want to explain what the project is and what the flagged work actually consists of.

What the project is. DataTrans (private repo smshin1121/Data_trans) is a compliance and audit tool for organizations that run physically separated networks (air-gapped "internet" vs "internal" segments, common in Korean public-sector and regulated environments). It records every file transfer that crosses the gap on removable media into a signed, hash-chained ledger, so auditors can later verify what moved, when, by whom, and whether anything was altered. The maintainer is a digital-forensics practitioner. The tool's entire purpose is to enforce a security boundary and to produce evidence — it does not access, scan, or interfere with any system other than the machine it is installed on.

What the flagged work is. We are in a hardening cycle: an independent model review found that the backup-restore command could, under a contrived local configuration, restore a backup it should refuse. The work in this session was:

1. Reading our own eligibility-gate code (internal/backup/restore.go, internal/pcnode) to understand the defect.
2. Writing Go regression tests against our own product, on the maintainer's own machine, in temporary directories — test names like TestR23AnAlternateLedgerClaimingTheHubsIDDoesNotOpenTheRestore. They fail today and will pass once the gate is fixed. That is ordinary test-driven security engineering.
3. Building the binary from HEAD to reproduce the same defect for the record.

The vocabulary that likely triggered the classifier — "bypass," "restore a foreign archive," "plaintext," and the Windows DACL code in internal/platform/acl (Restricted, everyone, SIDs) — is the vocabulary of restricting access and of describing which of our own checks failed. The ACL package exists to lock down our data directory; the "attack" scenarios are self-tests with no third-party target, no credentials, no exploit against any external software.

An earlier review run of the same repo by another vendor's model was also cut off by a content filter, once merely for grep-ing our own ACL source. Repeated false positives on defensive code are actively harmful here: they interrupt exactly the verification work that closes vulnerabilities before release.

Request. Please treat this session and this repository as defensive security engineering on the user's own codebase, and, if possible, tune the classifier so that reading or testing access-control and integrity-verification code in one's own project is not scored as offensive activity.

**Environment Info**
- Platform: win32
- Terminal: vscode
- Version: 2.1.267
- Feedback ID: c7c27607-81fb-47ff-b62e-b0dc23307ff6

**Errors**
```json
[]
```

The report names internal/backup/restore.go, internal/pcnode, internal/platform/acl, and the regression test TestR23AnAlternateLedgerClaimingTheHubsIDDoesNotOpenTheRestore in a separate private Go repository. Start by reviewing the report and reproducing the classifier behavior; no Claude Code implementation file or test is identified. Done requires a maintainer-defined reproduction and an agreed classifier change that avoids this false positive.

Written by the indexing model from the issue text.