Release workflow references actions by floating tags while holding npm and attestation credentials

## Problem

Follow-up from [#836 review](https://github.com/alibaba/open-code-review/pull/836#pullrequestreview-3550463356): `.github/workflows/release.yml` references third-party actions by floating tags while running with the repository's most sensitive credentials — `secrets.NPM_TOKEN` plus `id-token`/`attestations` permissions for provenance. A compromised or hijacked tag there has a wider blast radius than the same drift in CI: it can exfiltrate the npm token or publish tampered artifacts with valid-looking provenance.

Current floating references (`main`):

| Line | Reference |
|---|---|
| 33, 74, 171 | `actions/checkout@v7` |
| 55 | `actions/upload-artifact@v4` |
| 139, 179 | `actions/download-artifact@v4` |
| 148 | `softprops/action-gh-release@v3` |
| 156 | `actions/attest-build-provenance@v4` |

`softprops/action-gh-release` deserves particular care: it is a third-party (non-`actions/*`) action running in the job that holds release permissions.

## Suggestion

1. Pin every `uses:` in `release.yml` to a full commit SHA with the `# vX.Y.Z` comment, same convention as #836 established for `action.yml`.
2. Add `.github/workflows/release.yml` to the `files` array in `scripts/verify-action-pins.sh` so the invariant is CI-enforced.
3. Optionally extend to the remaining workflows later; `release.yml` first because of the credential exposure.

Happy to send the PR once #836 lands (it builds on the same check script).

Read .github/workflows/release.yml and compare its action references with the pinning convention established by #836. Then inspect scripts/verify-action-pins.sh and verify that release.yml is covered. Done means all listed uses entries are pinned to full commit SHAs with version comments and the verifier enforces the workflow.

Written by the indexing model from the issue text.