actions / actions/actions-runner-controller
RUNNER_TOKEN should be injected as a secret
Nobody has claimed this yet.
- Dominant language
- Go
- Stars
- 6.5k
- Forks
- 1.5k
- Avg merge
- 2d 2h
- Merged PRs (30d)
- 27
Description
What would you like added?
Currently the RUNNER_TOKEN env var is injected into the runner pod as a plain text value from the Runner k8s resource (plain text too).
RUNNER_TOKEN should be kept safe and not injected as a plain text value.
Why is this needed?
Anyone with permission to describe a runner pod or anyone with access to a monitoring system like DataDog is actually able to obtain this registration token.
This token is valid for 1hour and would allow a malicious actor to register arbitrary runners.
Contributor guide
First steps
- Read the whole issue, then the project's contributing guide.
- Comment on the issue to say you are picking it up — it saves two people doing the same work.
- Fork the repository and make your change on a branch.
- Open a pull request that references the issue number.
Research direction
Start by tracing the Runner Kubernetes resource and where RUNNER_TOKEN is injected into the runner pod, then inspect the controller's secret-handling path. Done means the registration token is no longer exposed as a plain-text resource or pod value while runner registration continues to work.
Written by the indexing model from the issue text.
Assessment
- Tech stack
- github-actions, go, kubernetes
- Domain
- devops, infrastructure, security
- Issue type
- Feature
- Difficulty
- 4/5
- Estimated time
- 3-5 days
- Activity status
- Stale
- Clarity
- Mostly clear
- Newbie friendliness
- 35/100