False positive: php_webshell_known fires on the German word "behindert" and on "WSO " in prose

Summary

The YARA rule php_webshell_known in src/skillspector/yara_rules/webshells.yar uses short, unanchored nocase strings. Two of them match ordinary prose, producing a CRITICAL finding at confidence 0.9 with the remediation "Remove the webshell code immediately" on skills that contain no code at all:

• $behinder = "behinder" nocase — matches the common German words behindert, behindern, Behinderung, behindertengerecht ("to impede", "disability"). Any German-language skill that discusses accessibility will trigger it.
• $wso2 = "WSO " nocase — matches any occurrence of the letters WSO followed by a space in ordinary prose.

Because condition: any of them, a single substring hit is enough.

Reproduction (v2.11.0, --no-llm)

de-skill/SKILL.md:

---
name: de-skill
description: Ein harmloser deutschsprachiger Skill ueber Barrierefreiheit.
---

# Barrierefreiheit

Zu kleine Schrift behindert das Lesen. Menschen mit Behinderung brauchen
ausreichende Kontraste. Ein Layout, das die Bedienung per Tastatur behindert,
ist nicht barrierefrei.

skillspector scan ./de-skill --no-llm --format json

Result:

score 45, severity MEDIUM, max_issue_severity CRITICAL
YR2  CRITICAL  conf 0.9
  pattern:  YARA rule 'php_webshell_known': Known PHP webshell families (c99, r57, b374k, WSO, etc.)
  finding:  'behinder; Behinder; behinder'
  remediation: Remove the webshell code immediately. Webshells provide unauthorized
               remote command execution. Audit the skill for additional backdoors ...

A second, English-language fixture reproduces the WSO variant:

We deploy the API on WSO 2 Micro Integrator.

YR2  CRITICAL  conf 0.9   finding: 'WSO '

Why this matters

This is not a cosmetic mismatch. The finding is the highest severity the scanner emits, at 0.9 confidence, and the accompanying text asserts a webshell is present and tells the reader to audit for further backdoors. For any non-English-speaking user, the false positive is not obviously false — the report claims a concrete, named malware family.

It also affects real corpora: I hit this while scanning an unrelated German-language skill whose only offence was the word behindert inside a plain Markdown reference file.

Suggested fix

1. Replace the two prose-colliding strings with markers that are actually specific to the shells:
   • Behinder (冰蝎) is better identified by its hardcoded AES key material or by BehinderShell / Behinder in combination with a PHP/JSP context, rather than the bare substring.
   • WSO is better identified by its banner text (e.g. Web Shell by oRb, already present as $wso) than by "WSO ".
2. More generally, consider requiring a code context (PHP/JSP/ASPX tags, eval, $_POST, …) before php_webshell_known can fire, or raising the threshold above any of them for the shortest strings. Rule webshells.yar already contains stronger, structural patterns ($preg_replace_e, $create_func) that do not have this problem.

The same class of short, unanchored nocase string appears in the other rule files as well, so a broader audit may be worthwhile.

Environment

• SkillSpector v2.11.0 (commit 7805bb9), installed from source
• Python 3.12.13, macOS (arm64)
• --no-llm static pass only

Start in src/skillspector/yara_rules/webshells.yar and reproduce the German and WSO cases with the Markdown fixtures and skillspector scan --no-llm --format json. Review php_webshell_known alongside its stronger structural patterns, then verify that ordinary prose no longer produces the CRITICAL finding while genuine webshell indicators remain detectable.