MetaMask should filter dust transactions from address poisoning attacks

### What is this about?

MetaMask should absolutely filter out dust transactions from address/history poisoning attacks.

Happens all the time: send some amount of ETH or USDC, less than a second later receive one gwei from a similar-looking address that closely resembles your destination.

I tried looking for a setting for this, without success. I refuse to believe MetaMask is vulnerable to this kind of attack in 2026, so please point me to the correct setting if there is one.

### Scenario

_No response_

### Design

_No response_

### Technical Details

_No response_

### Threat Modeling Framework

_No response_

### Acceptance Criteria

_No response_

### Stakeholder review needed before the work gets merged

- [ ] Engineering (needed in most cases)
- [ ] Design
- [ ] Product
- [ ] QA (automation tests are required to pass before merging PRs but not all changes are covered by automation tests - please review if QA is needed beyond automation tests)
- [ ] Security
- [ ] Legal
- [ ] Marketing
- [ ] Management (please specify)
- [ ] Other (please specify)

### References

_No response_

No source files, tests, entry points, design, threat model, or acceptance criteria are named. First clarify whether MetaMask should hide or otherwise filter one-gwei ETH or USDC transactions in address history, then locate the transaction-history implementation and define testable behavior for address-poisoning cases.

Written by the indexing model from the issue text.