Request for clarification: when using YubiKey's chalresp, are there individual challenges for every stored password?

As far as I understand how the Challenge-Response-Applet on the YubiKey works is: if you provide the YubiKey with the same challenge, you receive the same response.

I don't know exactly how KeePassDX handles things, but I assume during creation of the database, it concatenates (and probably hashes) the to be entered password and the response to a static challenge (probably randomly generated string stored on Android device? Plaintext? In its hardware wallet / enclave?). At least that's how for example dm-crypt/cryptsetup/luks does it when being used with a YubiKey.

That means: once $entity became aware of the response received from the HSM/YubiKey (assuming the challenge is a static string), the second factor is known and decrypting credentials from this very database does not need the HSM/YubiKey itself anymore.

It obviously could be, that there is its very own challenge generated and saved for every saved password, which would significantly improve things. But I didn't find any information about it.

Documentation/FAQ speaking of "master key" and "Yes, It is currently possible to unlock a database using your Yubikey." suggest, though, that this isn't the case.

Pointers and clarification would be highly appreciated! Respective documentation even more! Thanks! :)

Start with KeePassDX's YubiKey chalresp handling and the existing documentation/FAQ. Determine whether the challenge is static or individually generated for each stored password, then document how the master key and YubiKey are used and whether the stated security concern applies.