Arbitrary directory deletion via attacker-controlled `decompiledSrcPath` input.

Confirmed vulnerability: If an attacker can control the `decompiledSrcPath` argument to `JarLauncher`, they can cause the application to recursively delete any directory on the filesystem that is writable by the process. This is due to the call to `FileUtils.deleteDirectory(decompiledRoot)` (lines 83-91) without any path sanitization or restriction. There are no checks for symlinks, traversal, or safe directory boundaries. This allows for unintended and unsafe filesystem effects, including deletion of arbitrary directories.

Highest-risk effect: Arbitrary directory deletion via attacker-controlled `decompiledSrcPath` input.

** 🤖💪 Deploying Task Flow Agent(s): ['seclab_taskflows.personalities.web_application_security_expert']
** 🤖💪 Task ID: 2a2602e1-7e58-49a9-9d12-8e0fdb4cf44e
** 🤖💪 Model : openai/gpt-4.1
[03/31/26 15:59:41] INFO Starting MCP server 'Memcache' with transport 'stdio' server.py:2491

** 🤖🛠️ Tool Call: 7ff9e676e031memcache_get_state
Hypothesis checked:
- Potential for arbitrary directory deletion if attacker controls decompiledSrcPath input to JarLauncher.

Implementation paths inspected:
- JarLauncher.java: constructor and logic around jarPath and decompiledSrcPath (lines ~32, 41, 50, 59, 70, 74-80, 83-101, 117-124).
- FileUtils.deleteDirectory usage on decompiledRoot if decompile=true and directory exists.
- No path sanitization or restriction on decompiledSrcPath.

Concrete finding:
- If decompiledSrcPath is attacker-controlled, FileUtils.deleteDirectory will recursively delete any directory specified by the attacker, with no checks for symlinks or path traversal. This confirms a concrete vulnerability: arbitrary directory deletion.